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      I.         Abstract 
  
         Truth and Reconciliation processes are key to rebuilding societies damaged by 
broad-based, government-sanctioned violence by revising dominant cultural narratives of 
the  violence. In Indonesia, there has been no such process following the killings of 
between 500,000 and 2 million suspected communists and others in 1965-66. This paper 
is an exploration of conflict transformation theory, and of what form a truth and 
reconciliation process might take in Indonesia following 50 years of impunity. Using 
Joshua Oppenheimer’s 2012 and 2014 documentaries The Act of Killing and The Look of 
Silence as primary reference points, I apply critical discourse analysis to look at how the 
dominant narrative of the killings is upheld and discursively constructed, and at what 
counter-narratives are emerging that could give rise to conflict transformation and 
reconciliation. I ultimately offer an assessment of the readiness to take on such a process, 
based on analysis of the films and other contextual materials, including journalism and 
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III.       Introduction 
  
        In 2009, I spent a year living in Jakarta, Indonesia, as a high school foreign 
exchange student. Host families, teachers, and classmates embraced and supported me in 
an unforgettable way. I fell in love with this wonderful country and have since strived to 
learn as much as I can about Indonesia and its history. When Joshua Oppenheimer’s 2012 
and 2014 documentaries The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence were screened in 
theaters in my hometown, I rushed to see them. These films document massacres of 
civilians in 1965 after the Indonesian government was overthrown by the military. Early 
in the morning on September 30th, a group of “disaffected military officers” kidnapped 
and assassinated six of the most senior army generals and attempted a coup, which failed 
(McGregor). General Suharto crushed the coup and controlled the ensuing narrative, 
placing blame for the plot on the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia- PKI) (McGregor). The army directed killings of PKI members and other 
affiliated organizations, such as the Indonesian Women’s Movement. (McGregor). 
Anyone opposed to the military dictatorship or suspected to be sympathetic to the PKI 
could be accused of being a communist. This included union members, landless farmers, 
ethnic Chinese, left-leaning political activists, and intellectuals (Killing; Cribb and Ford; 
McGregor). At the local level, Suharto’s orders to purge communists became a license to 
work out “old political, religious, and ethnic hatreds” (Parry 106). Astonishingly, 
hundreds of thousands were tortured and executed without weapons of war, by hand 
(106).  In less than a year, between five hundred thousand and two million ‘communists’ 
were killed (Killing; Kwok, “Memory of Savage Anticommunist Killings”; McGregor). 
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 After the massacres, General Suharto continued to lead the country for 32 years, 
until 1998. In some cases, the architects and perpetrators of the slaughter still hold 
positions of power throughout the country, and are widely regarded as heroes given credit 
for shaping Indonesia’s democracy (Killing). How can there possibly be a healthy 
community, much less a democracy, in this situation, where killers triumph and retain 
power for decades? The victorious murderers have subverted the truth to perpetuate the 
myth of their heroism in the dominant narrative of Indonesia’s national identity. 
The Act of Killing focuses on the perpetrators of the killings, The Look of Silence 
on the victims. I had only heard briefly about these events during my time as an exchange 
student. Comments made in passing, such as that communism was illegal in Indonesia, 
constituted the glimpses I had of this turbulent chapter of Indonesian history. I was 
shocked by the films, their portrayal of the culture of impunity for those who perpetrated 
the violence, and the ongoing threats, intimidation, and violence against survivors that 
still grip the country. 
         I am interested in processes that shape and define national narratives. The national 
narrative of Indonesia is reaching an exceptionally fascinating juncture, in which counter-
narratives surrounding the massacres of 1965-66 are newly developing both within 
Indonesia and on a global scale. The fifty-year anniversary of the massacres in October 
2015, marked the following month by the convening of an International People’s 
Tribunal for Indonesia in the Hague, placed the question of initiating a truth and 
reconciliation process center-stage. Oppenheimer’s films explore what happens when 
government actors and their civilian confederates enjoy impunity after widespread 
executions of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The films are a compelling starting 
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point for an analysis of fledgling counter-narratives as well as of the dominant narrative 
memorializing the events of 1965-66. The Indonesian government has not officially 
recognized these events as crimes. Though many of the people directly involved in the 
massacres as executioners and survivors are still living, the window in which a truth and 
reconciliation process involving them can take place is closing. Through this paper, I 
draw on conceptual frameworks from the fields of conflict resolution, using critical 
discourse analysis to examine the narratives of the killings presented by Oppenheimer’s 
films for indications of readiness to change the dominant national narrative, and to 





























IV.        Review of Primary and Secondary Source Materials 
  
1.     Secondary Source Materials 
a.     Theory of Truth and Reconciliation Processes: Conflict Transformation 
Truth and reconciliation processes have been conceived and executed in 
numerous countries in response to episodes of unconstrained violence on a massive scale. 
Processes in South Africa following the collapse of the apartheid regime and in Rwanda 
in the wake of the genocide in 1994 are well known. Aspects of a truth and reconciliation 
process were also instrumental in Germany after World War II and in Northern Ireland 
after the peace accords. Guatemala undertook a Recovery of Historical Memory Project 
to address the legacy of its decades-long civil war (Maddison 217). Truth and 
reconciliation processes are complicated and varied projects. At the basis of any truth and 
reconciliation process lies the question of which goals should be pursued, through which 
particular institutional mechanisms, and in what order (Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 
194). In the realm of conflict management and reparation after large-scale violence, these 
processes are key to finding a way to confront the past and find healing and progress. 
Objectives such as ‘peace,’ ‘justice,’ ‘healing,’ and ‘democracy’ drive these efforts 
(Maddison 40). 
  Defining the province, methodology, and achievable objectives of truth and 
reconciliation processes is a complex endeavor. Truth and reconciliation commissions 
(TRCs) are not tools for addressing routine crimes, even when many victims are 
involved. They are instead mechanisms used by governments to address wide-scale, 
illegal violence committed, supported, enabled, or tolerated by governments. They are 
also used to reunite societies after civil wars in which government forces have massacred 
Mack 9 
civilians. As government apparatuses, TRCs bring legitimacy, power, access to 
information, the means of designing and building memorials, influence with all 
components of society, adequate funding, and the high profile required to change a 
national narrative (Brahm).  
In popular culture, TRCs are understood to be linear constructs in which events 
unfold sequentially, beginning with fact-finding missions and ending with full societal 
reconciliation. People know TRCs to be governmentally-created entities which have a 
mandate to dismantle ahistorical national narratives by creating public fora in which 
events of the past can be grappled with and new understandings can be reached to make 
more positive relationships between the victims and perpetrators of violence possible 
(Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 196). Victims are acknowledged and given a platform to 
voice their grief and frustration. Perpetrators admit and explain wrongdoing and take 
responsibility.  A breach in the culture is thus healed, and the community can move 
forward in peace and greater mutual understanding. To some extent, theorists accept this 
popular conception as a workable definition. David K. Androff, introducing a discussion 
of social work as a component of successful TRCs, defines TRCs as “a primary human 
rights intervention for post-conflict reconstruction” (Androff 1960). He sees TRCs as 
offering societies severely damaged by state-sanctioned violence a means to recovery 
which is in some cases superior to merely “maintaining security, providing humanitarian 
relief, promoting development, and seeking justice” (1961). In his view, TRCs provide 
restorative justice by investigating past abuses, hearing the stories of victims and 
perpetrators, and thus repairing the damaged social fabric (1960).  
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         Most scholars recognize a much more problematized theoretical framework for 
truth and reconciliation processes. Some would likely dispense with the term “TRC” due 
to its suggestion that a commission can accomplish repair and healing by conducting a 
fact-finding investigation and holding hearings. Theorists such as Sarah Maddison think 
of conflict characterized by violence on a massive scale—the kind of conflict which 
necessitates truth and reconciliation processes—in terms of conflict transformation rather 
than conflict resolution. Maddison disputes the theory of a cycle of conflict in which 
latent social tensions find public expression, escalate, then deescalate and resolve with 
post-conflict reconciliation (Maddison 23). This theory is fictitious in that it posits an end 
to conflict and conceives truth and reconciliation processes as the means to reaching that 
end. Maddison adopts the term “deeply divided societies” to describe communities 
“emerging from periods of violence and civil war, or that have other significant cleavages 
resulting from historical violence” (23). Maddison is cautious in her expectations from 
truth and reconciliation processes as a response to such violence in that  “the violent 
conflict, repression, and injustice that make up the history of such societies are multi-
layered and multifaceted, making it virtually impossible to determine which wrongs can 
feasibly be addressed, what this process might entail, and how to prioritize such efforts” 
(23). 
Conflict cannot be resolved by a truth and reconciliation process. Conflict is a 
complex social phenomenon that is essential in shaping healthy democratic societies 
(Maddison 23). Because of the persistent nature of conflict, reconciliation attempts do not 
begin with a “blank slate,” but unfold in a context “laden with problematic historical 
events that remain alive in contemporary consciousness and demand attention and 
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recognition” (Little; Lederach, as qtd. in Maddison 57). In fact, the long-term 
consequences of conflict are perpetual. The time never comes when “historical events or 
practices have run their course and no longer influence evolving social and practical 
relations” (Little, as qtd. in Maddison 58). The perpetuity of conflicts means that “they 
are constantly being reiterated, renegotiated and reconstituted and thus their impact on 
social and political structures is continual” (58).  The “complex temporality” of conflict is 
thus a crucial consideration in conflict transformation efforts (58). 
Conflict should be contained, channeled, and made overt through social and 
political processes that replace, and hopefully preclude, unconstrained violence. A 
process that replaces a nonfactual official narrative with an oversimplified narrative 
based on binaries of right and wrong, violated and violators, should be avoided 
(Maddison 25). The truth about conflicts can rarely be so cleanly divided. Direct violence 
may disappear temporarily or permanently, but structural and cultural violence arising 
from the deep fault lines that produced the historical breach persist and continue to 
produce marginalization, repression, and discrimination (Nadler, as qtd. in Maddison 27; 
McGregor). Failure to successfully transform the conflict leaves open the possibility of 
future episodes of unconstrained violence (27). Thus, the process must begin with a 
correct understanding of the nature of conflict and with the objective of conflict 
transformation.  Maddison identifies the following elements, which must be interwoven 
in designing a truth and reconciliation process.   
 
b.     The Role of Dialogue 
         All theorists emphasize the crucial role dialogue plays in any reconciliation 
attempt. Dialogue, while seemingly simple, is a delicate procedure, and one that must be 
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structured and guided towards constructive expression (Maddison 252). Emotions that 
have been repressed must be allowed to be fully expressed and realized. Dialogue is 
productive when managed in such a way that it can facilitate healing and be a starting 
point for change, not just an airing of grievances and a further cause for contention. The 
overarching goal of conflict transformation requires first a transformation in the way 
people in deeply divided societies talk to each other (255). 
Most importantly, dialogue must lead to “public policies and concrete actions 
which can be measured” (Noriega, as qtd. in Maddison 267). The fact that it often does 
not has led to perceptions that dialogue is an unproductive or unnecessary procedure, one 
that succeeds in stirring up deep emotions while failing to realize its promises of change. 
Committed parties from various sectors of civil society must be actively involved to help 
balance and shape this outcome (267).“[M]eaningful conflict transformation” is 
dependent on collaboration among individuals, government departments, and 
communities committed to “patience, persistence, creativity, risk, tolerance, and 
substantial investment over a long period of time” (269). 
John D. Ciorciari and Jaya Ramji-Nogales illustrate an additional feature of 
effective dialogue, which is that it must include diverse voices. They describe a process 
carried out in Cambodia by the governmental organization Renakse (Salvation Front), 
which conducted a nationwide review and condemnation of Khmer Rouge crimes 
(Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 200). The organizing committee held a series of 
community meetings at which victims gave testimonies about the brutality they faced and 
witnessed (200). Renakse unearthed mass graves and examined documents to collect 
evidence of damage done to both people and property by the Khmer Rouge (200). 
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Victims were invited to sign petitions detailing these atrocities (200). Although this 
process appeared to be truth commission-like in its methods (that is, gathering 
information to present a different version of the truth, inviting victims to speak, and 
bringing perpetrators to justice), the Renakse process was ineffective because it did not 
include any Khmer Rouge voices (201). Due to this exclusion, no “genuine dialogue” 
took place “between former foes” (214). The community meetings “did little to 
encourage public apologies that could have facilitated healing” (214), and as a result, 
victims and perpetrators had no opportunity to humanize one another (201). 
Another defect in the dialogue fostered by Renakse was that the findings were not 
shared with a broad audience (Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 201). Structured dialogues 
put on by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid 
tribunal combining domestic and international laws, procedures, and personnel (205-6) at 
the community level provided greater public awareness of information and fostered 
conversation about Khmer Rouge atrocities (206, 214). Perhaps most importantly, the 
ECCC-sponsored dialogues “created a space for victims and perpetrators to interact, and 
fostered understanding and forgiveness” (214). 
In order to successfully anticipate further processes, one purpose of dialogue must 
be to explore the “preferences of those who need to be reconciled” (Ciorciari and Ramji-
Nogales 216) in regard to the truth and reconciliation process as a whole. The role of civil 
society is to “build neutral, non-political forums for truth telling involving genuine 
dialogue between survivors and perpetrators” (216). Well-structured dialogue “can 
humanize complex historical conflicts and enable former adversaries to engage positively 
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with one another” (216). Through dialogue, a shared understanding of the events of the 
past, the responsible parties, and the victims may be achievable.    
  
c.     Memory and Memorialization as Precursors or Companions to Reconciliation 
Another important precursor to reconciliation is an agreement on a shared account 
of history and a new approach to how the original violence will be remembered. As 
complex as truth and reconciliation processes are to design and execute, they are a crucial 
means of challenging ahistorical national narratives regarding violent social breaches on 
a massive scale. It is not enough to forget the past and move forward. The obscured past 
atrocity “will continue to constrain all efforts to construct a more democratic society until 
the nation develops an understanding of how [the victims of violence] experienced and 
internalized state and insurgent structures of terror as part of their individual and 
collective identities” (Sanford, as qtd. in Maddison 29). Even after decades, the 
experience of genocide persists in the national psyche as “an officially silenced national 
trauma reverberating throughout the society” (29). 
Truth recognition processes, such as the Recovery of Historical Memory Project 
in Guatemala, are a crucial first step in confronting atrocities that have been officially 
denied or mischaracterized. “Establishing a shared truth about past collective violence 
and human rights abuses is seen as a ‘prerequisite for achieving accountability, 
meaningful reconciliation, and a foundation for a common future’” (Chapman, as qtd. in 
Maddison 49). Acknowledgement of “huge violations of people’s human rights” must 
precede reconciliation and conflict transformation efforts (Hunt, as qtd. in Maddison 44). 
The process of developing a shared narrative, of listening to others state their 
understandings of the past, and creating an account of a “chaotic and painful past” (161) 
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is an important first step in reconciliation efforts, and lays the groundwork for greater 
efforts to manage conflict and begin healing. Some theorists caution that a universally 
shared understanding of the meaning of the facts may never be achieved. Fortunately, “A 
shared moral account of the nature of past wrongs” is not an indispensable prerequisite to 
moving forward (Schaap, as qtd. in Maddison 51). 
The challenge of finding a shared national narrative about atrocities is particularly 
daunting in circumstances like Indonesia’s, where a truth and reconciliation process is 
emerging in a context of impunity. While reconciling people is certainly the ultimate 
goal, it is not always the best place to start (Opotow 161). Opotow proposes first 
addressing “the contingencies of justice”—what happened in the past, who is responsible, 
and why these events happened in the first place (161-2). A single interpretation of the 
past is not expected to be agreed upon, but parties do need to be “mutually tolerant of a 
limited set of interpretations [...] a shared narrative may, therefore, require revising their 
preexisting narratives or reinterpreting their earlier experiences” (161).  
The question of how high the level of agreement on the facts and their meaning 
has to be in order to ultimately succeed in conflict transformation is a perplexing one. 
Clearly, the dominant national narrative cannot continue to be rankly nonfactual. Factual 
accounts cannot continue to be faltering acts of narrative insurgency. The absence of a 
shared understanding of the past violence and its causes “reinforces the sense of isolation 
and difference between the two communities, underscoring the persistent threat of 
violence and impeding other reconciliation efforts” (McCaughey; Community Relations 
Council, as qtd. in Maddison 210). The critical mass of narrative agreement is 
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particularized to a given society, but if it is not achieved, neither will conflict 
transformation be achieved (210). 
 In post-conflict societies, the dominant narrative is usually under the control of 
elites. For some theorists, the goal of TRCs is to replace the dominant narrative, which 
serves the purposes of elites and protects their power and privileges, with a narrative 
reflecting the lives of marginalized populations (Maddison 208). Such counter-narratives 
“refuse to allow past injustice to be excused as incidental to the nation-building agenda” 
(208).  Little posits a far less ambitious goal when he says, “...reconciliation efforts 
should not focus so much on the discovery of one ‘truth’ but on how accommodation 
between conflicting historical accounts might be attained in order to ‘make a conflict 
more liveable’” (Little, as qtd. in Maddison 210). 
A companion effort to the retrieval of the facts and fashioning of a narrative is the 
memorialization of the story that emerges. Memorialization arises from memory, but also 
reaches back to reinforce the narrative that produces it. Murals and memorials in 
Guatemala, for example, “‘[do] vital memorializing work’ to help ‘create a public, 
shared, and fixed rendering of the mass experience of violence’” (Nelson, as qtd. in 
Maddison 245). A larger scale museum memorializing the victims from both sides of the 
Guatemalan civil war is being constructed in a building that formerly housed the secret 
police archives (246). In addition to presenting information about historical genocides 
and other Latin American Cold War counterinsurgency wars, this museum will provide a 
“shrine space” to mourn the victims and casualties of the war, many of whom do not have 
a grave that can be visited on Dia de los Muertos (246). Julio Solórzano-Foppa, one of 
the architects of this project, finds it fitting “to carry on the tradition of building 
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memorials ‘in places where violations of human rights occurred’” (Solórzano-Foppa, as 
qtd. in Maddison 246). Such repurposing of public space for memorialization of the 
ascendant narrative seems best suited to societies in which there is a high level of 
agreement about the facts and their meaning.  
Where widespread resistance to a new national narrative regarding atrocities may 
exist, more inclusive memorials may have a better chance of being successfully 
embedded in the consciousness of the community. For example, in Cambodia, stupas—
“Buddhist religious monuments used for worship and remembrance” (Ciorciari and 
Ramji-Nogales 201)—have been constructed where surviving family members can pray 
for the spirits of the dead. Possibly due to the sheer numbers of perpetrators, the 
Cambodian experience of successful memorialization has been with less divisive 
projects. “Ceremonies and memorials have been more conducive to healing when they 
have focused on sharing communal suffering and honoring loved ones rather than 
focusing enmity on perpetrators and their kin” (215). 
Another consideration in memorialization is the local community. It is “at the 
local level that most people experience conflict,” and the local level is where “the 
chances of reconciliation are greatest, because people know both each other and the 
issues at hand” (Wessels, as qtd. in Maddison 248). Impactful memorializations in 
Cambodia have been created in communities and have drawn on local culture and 
religion, “appealing to Buddhist principles of tolerance and forgiveness” (Ciorciari and 
Ramji-Nogales 215). Similarly, in a project called ‘Re-Imagining Communities,’ the Arts 
Council of Northern Ireland has replaced hundreds of murals delineating neighborhoods 
with threatening military-type imagery with images that convey a more accessible 
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identity, such as football players or figures from Celtic mythology (Maddison 246). In 
one neighborhood, a painting of an armed partisan over the words ‘YOU ARE NOW 
ENTERING LOYALIST SANDY ROW HEARTLAND OF SOUTH BELFAST 
ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS’, was covered up by a painting of King William III, 
the Prince of Orange (Maddison 246, original emphasis). The new image “still clearly 
marked the area as staunchly Protestant and loyalist, but the image itself was far less 
threatening” (246). 
  
d.     Apology and Forgiveness as Process 
         “Apologies are not simply an act but a process focused on the possibility of a 
future relationship” (Verdeja, as qtd. in Maddison 226). The symbolic power of acts of 
contrition and forgiveness, juxtaposing perpetrator and victim, can reverberate through a 
society, creating the possibility of reconciliation and shoring up a newly-adopted national 
narrative regarding officially-sanctioned atrocities (227-8). But how are apologies to be 
secured, and forgiveness to be given?  After taking the newly-established narrative and 
numerous context-specific variables into account, the designers of the process must 
consider what is achievable as well as specifics such as who apologizes, who officiates, 
and who forgives. Since the violence was officially sanctioned, the perpetrators in most 
cases will not have been held accountable through criminal justice processes. The 
underlying conflict will have persisted as structural violence and oppression of victims 
even after the cessation of overt violence. If the perpetrators are willing to take 
responsibility and apologize completely for the wrongs they have committed, are victims 
expected to forgive them immediately and without reservation? The complexity of 
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securing both apology and forgiveness in the face of ongoing oppression and impunity 
quickly becomes obvious.  
Where achievable, apology and forgiveness are the desired next step after truth 
processes have successfully revised the official narrative of government-sanctioned 
atrocities.  “Central to the relational tasks of reconciliation efforts are the projects 
designed to draw former enemies into relationship with one another through apology, 
forgiveness and individual and societal healing” (Maddison 225).  Apologies are a deeply 
symbolic way to express responsibility and remorse (225). The same official actors who 
directly (or through predecessors) approved or ignored the killings are in a position to 
offer some means of making amends to victims. Removing barriers to opportunity, 
returning stolen property, and payment of reparations come to mind. Where apologies are 
not accompanied by “‘direct and immediate actions’” or another sort of “‘practical 
component,’” such as compensation, “they may amount to little more than a ‘hollow 
symbolic statement’ that does little to transform the status of victims and survivors” 
(Minow, as qtd. in Maddison 227). 
In a truth and reconciliation context, an apology is not only a statement, but also 
an action (Onus, qtd. in Maddison 227). “It’s not enough to just say sorry. You’ve got to 
then take steps and follow it through” (227). Apologies serve to open “political space” in 
which “citizens may reflect on more critical views of their troubled histories” (226). This 
is especially evident in the case of apologies issued by political elites. The actions that 
result from these apologies have a particular importance as a response to countering 
entrenched social issues (225). Elite apologies can be a first step to instilling greater 
political stability (Verdeja, as qtd. in Maddison 225-6). The action they suggest is that 
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“critical reinterpretations of history” are necessary, that victims are morally valuable and 
politically recognized, and that the public has the power to imagine new possibilities of 
relation between the state and society (225-6). 
As to the question of how forgiveness is to be extracted from fantastically 
aggrieved victims, many suffering ongoing systemic abuse, Desmond Tutu cautions that 
people who have been victimized need not condone what has been done to them or to 
their family members, friends, or community. Once the wrong is taken seriously, that can 
“[draw] out the sting in the memory that threatens to poison our entire existence” (Tutu, 
as qtd. in Maddison 227). Forgiveness can justifiably be positioned as an expression and 
acts performed for the sake of victims themselves as well as for perpetrators and the 
culture as a whole. Forgiveness is a part of the healing process for survivors as well as for 
the larger community. “‘[T]he healing of memories allows traumatized people to connect 
at ‘the deepest human level’, which [...] is important for national reconciliation” 
(Lapsley, qtd. in Maddison 229). While perfect apologies and unstinting forgiveness may 
prove elusive, they are still foundational elements of the process. However, in the 
absence of conflict transformation that results in what may reasonably be called 
reconciliation, the transference of the conflict into the political sphere will do.  “[H]ealing 
processes can be understood as an attempt to negotiate the public emotional life of a 
divided society, placing anger and fear in context and drawing on other emotions, such as 
empathy and compassion, in the hope of establishing a more respectful relationship 
across difference and division” (230). 
  
e.     Reconciliation as Process 
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Recovering systematically repressed facts about the violent insult to the 
community, followed by apology and forgiveness to the extent those are achievable, 
opens a door to reconciliation (Maddison 48).  Again, reconciliation here is not to be 
understood as a resolution of, and end to, conflict. Instead, reconciliation processes 
address “the political challenges involved in finding ways for people in deeply divided 
societies to live together democratically and non-violently, with radical differences” ( 
Ramsbotham et al., as qtd. in Maddison 45, original emphasis). 
The term “reconciliation” is complicated and adaptable. Hamber and Kelly, for 
example, see reconciliation as composed of five elements:  “the development of a shared 
vision of an interdependent and fair society; a means of acknowledging and dealing with 
the past; the building of positive relationships; significant cultural and attitudinal change; 
and substantial social, economic, and political change” (Hamber and Kelly, as qtd. in 
Maddison 49-50). What is reconciled in a reconciliation process is not the conflict within 
a deeply divided society, but past and present, the needs of the entire community and the 
needs of victims: 
Reconciliation seeks to anticipate the future while acknowledging and 
memorializing the past; it seeks to be politically inclusive while focusing 
on the needs and rights of victims (du Toit 2009: 256); it is both discursive 
and normative (Renner 2012: 55); and ‘at once political, legal, cultural, 
moral, psychological, and spiritual’ (Kiss 2000: 80); it incorporates 
‘psychological, structural and political elements’ (Wale 2013: 8); it is 
concerned with both institutional transformation and the restoration of 
trust (Mack 2011: 450-1); and it operates at multiple levels, including the 
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personal and the political (Quinn 2009: 4). Reconciliation is emphatically 
not a process of conflict resolution of the kind that delegitimizes or 
represses important forms of political resistance and struggle (Schirch, as 
qtd. in Maddison 50-1). 
“Despite its complexities,” there is great value in preserving  “the rhetorical 
power” of the concept of reconciliation, while simultaneously expanding its use to 
incorporate “aspects of transition, peacebuilding and transformation” (Maddison 40). 
Reconciliation plays a crucial role in “constituting a space for democratic politics out of a 
condition of violence” (Muldoon, as qtd. in Maddison 40). Reconciliation enables the 
development of a sustainable democracy and nonviolent conflict management strategies 
(40). Key to creating such a democracy is the regular and active participation of civil 
society in all efforts of reconciliation (Ciociari and Ramji-Nogales 199).  
Charles Villa-Vicencio recognizes reconciliation not only as a goal, but as a 
process. Reconciliation necessarily requires finding ways to bring people together over 
what are often “‘historical and entrenched barriers of suspicion, prejudice and 
inequality’” (Villa-Vicencio, as qtd. in Maddison 46). The task of shifting values, of 
instilling a “‘willingness to venture beyond the promotion of rigid identities’” (46) and 
cultivating energy to imagine and pursue “‘a different set of relations with one’s 
adversaries and enemies’” (46) is no brief or straightforward venture. This is a goal that 
requires patience, and the understanding that steps taken today may not immediately lead 
to visible outcomes or changes, but that they lead towards the creation of a foundation 
upon which future generations will build. 
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In summary, then, truth and reconciliation processes are conceived as a means of 
transforming conflict in ways that bring it into nonviolent social and political arenas and 
modes of being (Muldoon, as qtd. in Maddison 53). We may think of conflict 
transformation as the broad objective. Under that umbrella are “truth” processes 
(dialogue, memory retrieval and memorialization) and “reconciliation” processes 
(forgiveness and apology, reconciliation). While the truth processes must begin before 
the reconciliation processes, they need not be completed before the reconciliation 
processes can begin. Since each of these elements is a process, each is ongoing, just as 
the process of conflict transformation to which they contribute is ongoing. Together, 
these processes accomplish the foregrounding of repressed information (53). They 
politicize the conflict that led to the violent breach in the social fabric by accommodating 
it in political discourse and practices. A successful truth and reconciliation process is the 
means by which a nonfactual national narrative is successfully challenged and replaced 
by a factual counter-narrative. Such a process can empower citizens to create a stable and 
healthy democracy. 
  
f.      The Problem of Impunity 
Conceiving and implementing truth and reconciliation processes is particularly 
challenging in circumstances that have been characterized by impunity for a prolonged 
period of time. The first set of challenges arises from the passage of time since the 
original conflict. The argument may be made that truth and reconciliation become 
meaningless when most of the perpetrators and most of the victims have died due to the 
passage of time. Who remains to be held accountable, and who to be recognized as 
victims? The answer is that profound, extensive, officially sanctioned violence within a 
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nation creates intergenerational scripts which continue to compromise the health of 
society long after the actual perpetrators and victims have died (Maddison 69).  The 
“complex emotional burdens” of violence on families and communities are lasting (69). 
Trauma, and the accompanying “memories of historical violence,” can be transmitted 
intergenerationally, “influencing present and future perceptions of the other community” 
and fueling “volatile” political environments that are found in divided societies (Staub 
and Pearlman; Hutchison and Bleiker, as qtd. in Maddison 69). Guilt and a sense of 
responsibility may also be handed down from one generation to the next (Barkan; 
Maddison, as qtd. in Maddison 69). Further, as discussed above, unmanaged conflict is 
not exhausted by a singular explosive expression, but continues to manifest itself, 
sometimes in periodic direct violence, but almost always in structural and cultural 
violence expressed as injustice, exclusion, inequality, prejudice, ignorance, and 
discrimination (Ramsbotham, as qtd. in Maddison 26). 
Susan Opotow examines the difficulty of reconciliation in post-conflict situations 
when crimes against humanity (such as mass murder) are either explicitly or implicitly 
excused, or when it becomes expedient to “look the other way,” and impunity is 
institutionalized (Opotow 150). Institutionalized impunity creates a culture of impunity in 
which abuses go unpunished and justice is absent (150). Opotow identifies three 
interrelated facets of impunity—structural impunity (relating to “institutional structures 
of the state, such as constitutional authority conferred on the army for internal security”), 
strategic impunity (that is, “specific procedures and structures adopted to prevent 
criminal investigation or prosecution”), and political/psychological impunity (the 
“manipulation of fear, distrust, and isolation among citizens,” the “most poignant and 
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tragic of all aspects of impunity”) (151). She discusses the relationship between violence 
and impunity, citing Johann Galtung’s distinction between direct and structural violence 
(151). Direct violence is understood as violence that is explicit, overt, and committed by 
specific people upon specific victims (151). Structural violence is imperceptible, upheld 
in societal structures as “the way things are done,” and manifests as inequalities 
structured into society (such as access to social goods and services that promote well-
being only for some members of society) (151). In cultures of impunity, these forms of 
violence are indistinguishable (152). 
Impunity is dependent on a set of relationships that guard and uphold it, lending 
social support to institutional bodies and actors that should otherwise be punished for 
perpetrating crimes against humanity (Opotow 153). These relationships, called 
collusion, depend on cooperation and mutual protection of shared interests (that is, not 
being punished) in groups of perpetrators of direct violence, as well as requiring the 
support of larger networks (154). Police officers, for example, might participate in 
corrupt or violent behavior. They depend on other institutions, such as the court system, 
to “protect them from accountability” (154) and to maintain the status quo from which 
they benefit. This builds a moral framework in which violence towards some people is 
acceptable and appropriate (155). This “moral exclusion” (155) rationalizes harm 
inflicted on those perceived to be beyond the scope of justice (156), dehumanizing 
victims and members of less dominant groups while bolstering dominant group members’ 
perceptions of their own dignity, humanity, and worthiness for access to resources and 
protections of the state (156). 
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Institutionalized, longstanding impunity becomes a politically expedient strategy. 
It has serious impacts on how different groups view one another and their willingness to 
work with one another, creating difficulty in rallying the necessary institutional bodies to 
participate or encourage or allow TRCs to begin taking shape (Opotow 160). Members of 
dominant or “in-groups” (156) are coming from a place where non-dominant (or “out-
group”) members are viewed as so irrelevant that they do not have the same claims to 
fairness, justice, or resources (156). If impunity is longstanding, in-group members may 
have come to minimize and lose their grasp of the severity of their crimes (157). Violence 
is glorified and supported by institutions and individuals. Summoning the will to feel 
prepared to potentially face the loss of these protections and benefits is immense and 
complicated. While to some extent TRCs take place at the level of individuals, it is also 
key to their success that they be met with institutional support and guidance, so that long-
term goals and changes can be addressed (Maddison 268). Parties that have emerged 
victorious from conflicts can thwart attempts to prosecute violators of human rights 
(Opotow 160). They may negotiate amnesties and pardons as preconditions for peace 
talks, thereby negating the possibility for justice (160). 
For out-group members, this culture of moral exclusion and impunity is a source 
of pain, anxiety, and grief. For many survivors of Pol Pot’s regime in Cambodia, for 
example, Khmer Rouge impunity is a “source of continuing anguish” and an “obstacle to 
personal healing” (Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales 198). Reconciliation efforts thus face 
extensive challenges in “cultivating a new attitude towards others” as the basis for 
addressing “the major material and structural challenges” that perpetuate war and 
violence in post-conflict societies (Villa-Vicencio, as qtd. in Maddison 46). The success 
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of the process hinges on changing the perception of some members of society as beyond 
the reach of justice, and of instilling the urgency for remorse in a system that minimizes 
these experiences by supporting perpetrators of violence (Opotow 156).  
  
g.     Discourse Analysis in Understanding Truth and Reconciliation Processes 
Discursive strategy analysis and construction is at the heart of truth and 
reconciliation. The fundamental task of truth and reconciliation processes is to identify 
and call into question the accuracy of dominant national narratives which deny, obscure, 
or falsify governmentally-sanctioned episodes of violence on a massive scale. The 
identification of these narratives depends on the close reading of cultural texts, including 
publications, films, and other public and private discourse. Truth and reconciliation 
processes can be seen as attempts to constitute opposing narratives to challenge and 
correct a nonfactual dominant narrative. The discursive choices constituting both 
dominant and challenger narratives are highly strategic. 
Maddison touches on the rhetorical dimension of truth and reconciliation in her 
analysis of how the continuity of conflict post-catastrophe can be either hidden or clearly 
identified. The ways post-conflict violence is discursively portrayed should have a role in 
how reconciliation and conflict transformation efforts are imagined and structured 
(Maddison 33). Violence is spoken of in different terms when it is thought of as being 
officially over, although there are certainly still “continuities of violence” between the 
war and postwar intervals (Schuld, as qtd. in Maddison 33). Similarly, narratives have a 
role in curtailing violence by bringing conflict into the political arena (Muldoon, as qtd. 
in Maddison 53). This happens “not because there is sudden agreement about past 
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wrongs, but because marginalized groups politicize those past actions by renaming them 
as injustices” (53).  
Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak have designed a Discourse-Historical Approach 
(DHA) to critical discourse analysis. Their approach is adaptable for use in a truth and 
reconciliation context. The questions they devise in examining discursive strategies are 
useful in the close reading of pertinent cultural texts. 
1.  How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and 
actions named and referred to linguistically? 
2.  What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social 
actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes? 
3.  What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? 
4.  From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and 
arguments expressed? 
5.  Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they 
intensified or mitigated? 
    (Reisigl and Wodak 93) 
The answers to these questions illuminate the speaker’s discursive strategy as to 
the five dimensions identified by Reisigl and Wodak. All five dimensions will be present 
in every discourse. The first, nomination, is the discursive construction of actors and 
events. The second, predication, is the positive or negative qualification of actors and 
events. The third, argumentation, either justifies or questions truth and rightness claims. 
The fourth, perspectivization, positions the speaker’s point of view, showing either 
involvement or distance. The last, intensification and mitigation, modifies the force of 
Mack 29 
assertions made, one way or the other (Wodak and Meyer 93). In the context of discourse 
about officially-sanctioned killing of civilians on a mass scale, calibrating a speaker’s 
discursive strategy enables the analyst to assess the relative strengths and vulnerabilities 
of the dominant national narrative as well as of competing narratives. This analysis is 
ground zero in accurately understanding the contours and progress of truth and 
reconciliation processes.  
  
2.     Primary Source Materials 
         Until the release of The Act of Killing, the events of 1965 were relatively 
unknown both within Indonesia and to the international community. Oppenheimer’s two 
films have provided an important precursor to the possibility of conceiving and executing 
an official truth and reconciliation process. The films and other primary source materials 
reveal the contours that a process in Indonesia might take by disclosing the dominant 
narrative, challenger narratives, and current discourses in Indonesia about these 
completing narratives. Taken together, Oppenheimer’s films provide a truly extraordinary 
range of perspectives, from articulations of the dominant national narrative to fledgling 
counter-narratives. 
As primary texts, The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence are amenable to deep 
analysis using the discourse-historical approach to discourse analysis designed by Reisigl 
and Wodak as a means to examine how the perpetrators and the victims discursively 
construct narratives that either support or counter the dominant national narrative of the 
killings. The films are also susceptible to examination according to theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks advanced in secondary source materials by Ciorciari and Ramji-
Nogales, Maddison, Opotow, and others. This serves as a way to explore how different 
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processes integral to reconciliation are or are not taking shape, what obstacles they may 
face, and what considerations are appropriate in terms of larger scale reconciliation in 
Indonesia’s context of institutionalized impunity. Other primary source materials are used 
as counterpoints and substantiating documents, including reports and transcripts issued 


































V.       Methodology 
  
My approach to this inquiry is to draw on my background in the field of English 
to conduct critical discourse analyses of Joshua Oppenheimer’s films. The study of 
English as a discipline involves the central tasks of creating, identifying, analyzing, 
challenging, and revising texts and narratives. Essential to these tasks are considerations 
of discursive strategy and of how narratives function in a culture. Treating 
Oppenheimer’s documentaries as texts, I identify and analyze the dominant narrative, as 
well as counter-narratives, about the events of 1965 in Indonesia. My main interest is in 
how the already-existing dominant narrative is discursively reconstructed and reinforced 
(and how that impacts people’s understanding of these events) as well as how counter-
narratives are taking shape to displace the narrative justifying the state-sponsored 
slaughter of civilians. This narrative revision is an indispensable step toward a 
reconciliation process. 
Critical discourse analysis is “characterized by the common interest in de-
mystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and retroductable investigation 
of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)” (Wodak and Meyer 3, original emphasis). 
Discourse is seen as a form of “social practice,” in that it is indicative of dialectical 
relationships between “a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and 
social structure(s), which frame it” (Fairclough and Wodak, as qtd. in Wodak and Meyer 
5). Discourse is both “socially constitutive” and “socially conditioned”— “it constitutes 
situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between 
people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and 
reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it” (6). 
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Critical discourse analysis is an analytical method well suited to an inquiry into how a 
fictitious and unjust social narrative is upheld, and how it might be subverted. 
My inquiry into truth and reconciliation processes, and the shape they might take 
in Indonesia, is structured around an adapted version of the discourse historical approach 
(DHA) to critical discourse analysis laid out by Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak. The 
DHA is centered on trying to create “a theory of discourse by linking fields of action 
(Girnth, 1996), genres, discourses and texts” (Wodak and Meyer 26). The DHA follows 
Mouzelis’ recommendations for social research, namely to “develop conceptual tools 
adequate for specific social problems,” focusing in particular on the field of politics, 
where it “develops conceptual frameworks for political discourse” (26).  I have 
condensed Wodak and Reisigl’s original outline for the DHA to better suit the scale of 
this particular project. They propose an 8-step model, which I have modified to a 5-step 
model by combining some steps and omitting others. I use Reisigl and Wodak’s 
methodology to examine how the events of 1965 are discursively constructed in 
Oppenheimer’s documentaries and various contextual documents. These findings are 
assembled in tables located in Appendices B and C. The adapted steps from Reisigl and 
Wodak’s approach are listed below.1 
After analyzing primary source materials with this method, I then apply concepts 
discussed above from secondary source materials to Oppenheimer’s films, examining the 
roles of dialogue, impunity, memory and memorialization, and reconciliation in conflict 
transformation in the Indonesian context. What aspects of these major processes do the 
primary source materials exhibit?  How are they discursively constructed? What might 
that indicate overall regarding the presence of preconditions for conflict transformation 
                                               
1See original proposal in Appendix A  
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and reconciliation in Indonesia? I draw conclusions from the analysis using these 
theoretical structures. I also utilize pieces of mainstream Indonesian journalism and other 
reports and proceedings relating to the events of 1965-66 to contextualize Oppenheimer’s 
films in public discourse. Finally, I assess where things currently stand in Indonesia in 
terms of readiness to take on a reconciliation process, and imagine how this process 
might proceed. 
The steps in the adapted discourse-historical approach to critical discourse 
analysis are as follows:   
1. Activate and consult preceding theoretical knowledge (i.e. recollection, reading, 
and discussion of previous research). Specifically, research about the purpose, 
methodology, and application of truth and reconciliation processes. 
2. Systematic collection of data, context information (various discourses and 
discursive events, social fields as well as actors, semiotic media), and primary 
source materials. 
3. Evaluation of primary source materials using discourse analysis strategies 
outlined in Wodak and Reisigl’s chapter on the Discourse Historical Approach. 
Identify and analyze discursive strategies which shape the dominant and insurgent 
narratives concerning 1965. Discursive strategies are as follows: 
I. Nomination—the discursive construction of actors and events. How are 
persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes, and actions named and 
referred to linguistically? 
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II. Predication—The positive or negative qualification of actors and events. 
What characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to social actors, 
objects, phenomena/events and  processes? 
III. Argumentation—The justification of truth and rightness claims. What 
arguments are employed in the discourse in question? 
IV. Perspectivization—Positioning of the speaker’s point of view, showing 
either involvement or distance. From what perspective are these 
nominations, attributions, and arguments expressed? 
V. Intensification and Mitigation—Modification of force of assertions made. 
Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or 
mitigated?  
(Reisigl and Wodak  93).   
4. Draw conclusions from the analysis. 
5. Assess where Indonesia stands on the road to reconciliation. Imagine how 











VI.      Analysis 
  
 The dominant narrative of the massacres was constructed and reinforced over the 
span of Suharto’s rule. Suharto launched a propaganda campaign that “provided the 
trigger for the mass killings of 1965-66” (McGregor). Following the crushing of the 
September 30th Movement, the army worked to “shut down Communist and other leftist 
publications,” and pro-army newspapers began to dominate the media (McGregor). These 
newspapers “set about spreading grisly accounts of the murders of the army leaders, 
claiming their bodies had been mutilated prior to and after their deaths” (McGregor). The 
retaliatory killings of civilians were subsequently minimized and misrepresented in 
school textbooks, further supporting the formation of the dominant narrative (McGregor). 
Within weeks of the failed coup, the military had produced a book emphasizing the PKI’s 
responsibility and “their alleged depravity during the kidnapping and killing of the seven 
army martyrs” (McGregor). A propaganda film reenactment of the killings was shown 
repeatedly on all television stations (McGregor). The regime designated October 1st as 
“Sacred Pancasila Day”—a commemoration of the day the national ideological principles 
had been saved from a communist plot (McGregor). After the fall of Suharto in 1998, a 
few brave people inside and outside of the government started challenging the dominant 
narrative, although their efforts were consistently met with obstruction, threats, and actual 
violence (McGregor).   
In 2012, two events brought simmering fears and anger regarding the 1965 
massacres in Indonesia to the forefront of public consciousness. One was the release of a 
report by Indonesia’s National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) on the 
results of its investigation into human rights violations in 1965. The second was the 
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release of documentarian Joshua Oppenheimer’s film The Act of Killing. Two years later, 
in 2014, Oppenheimer released a companion film, The Look of Silence, also dealing with 
the events of 1965. In November 2015, an International People’s Tribunal convened in 
the Hague and took four days of testimony concerning those same events. Each of these 
seminal texts has been reported and discussed in the popular press. Oppenheimer’s 
provocative films, in which perpetrators of government-sanctioned mass murder frankly 
discuss their crimes, have become the focal point of both national and international 
conversations about whether and how Indonesia’s government might institute a truth and 
reconciliation process. 
  
1.     Joshua Oppenheimer’s The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence 
The Act of Killing and its companion film, The Look of Silence, focus on the 
prolific yet little known Indonesian massacres of ethnic Chinese, suspected communists, 
alleged enemies of the state, and others in 1965-66. Though quite different in approach, 
with the first providing a platform primarily for the perpetrators, the second for the 
victims, the films together document the continuing damage resulting from the lack of 
accountability and of a government-sponsored process for truth and reconciliation. 
Oppenheimer discovers that the perpetrators, though triumphant, live in fear. They fear 
the surviving family members of the murdered and the possibility of a correction to the 
national narrative glorifying their brutality. The victims live in despair and in fear of 
suffering the same fate as their family members. The combined effects of structural, 
strategic, and political impunity deepen the chasm between victims and perpetrators. 
Oppenheimer’s films horrifyingly document the resulting deep, pervasive unease on both 
sides. The current situation in Indonesia demonstrates Maddison’s hypothesis that 
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conflict is not resolved with the end of open hostilities. Instead, it goes underground, 
flaring up from time to time.
2
 
The films document the dominant cultural narrative concerning the events of 1965 
through the voices of the killers and their government collaborators, as well as the way 
insurgent narratives bump up against the dominant narrative through the voices of 
victims. The filmmaker constitutes his own independent discourse, which is also highly 
relevant to the question of what form truth and reconciliation processes might take.  
  
a.     Discourse analysis of The Act of Killing 
The Act of Killing is a discursively complex and intriguing text. It is structured not 
just around Oppenheimer’s interviews and interactions with former killers, but also 
around the killers’ own reenactments of their involvement as gangsters and death squad 
leaders in north Sumatra in 1965. The reenactments are woven through Oppenheimer’s 
documentary to shape a portrait of one side’s experience of these events. The killers’ 
retellings of the murders are elaborately staged on the set of their own film, where they 
control and construct how past events should look, should be acted, and should be 
directed. Their taste for the cinematic is stunning. These scenes are set between 
interviews—sometimes in groups, sometimes in one-on-one discussions with 
Oppenheimer—where the perpetrators reflect on what happened in 1965, what the 
consequences have been, and what they think now about those events. The official 
narrative is continuously constructed throughout the film including in interviews with 
                                               
2 The conflict Oppenheimer documents is still active and dangerous, despite the passage of 50 
years since the original violence took place. When government action causes a breach in the 
social fabric which creates a deeply-divided society, only a government-sponsored truth and 
reconciliation process effecting conflict transformation can render the conflict “safe.” 
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public figures such as Ibrahim Sinik, a famous newspaper publisher in Medan; in  Anwar 
Congo and Herman Koto’s appearance on a local news channel; and in Vice President 
Jusuf Kalla’s address to a paramilitary rally. Sometimes worried about sounding too 
harsh, these figures will turn to the camera and assure their invisible audience, and the 
film crew, that they aren’t really that violent normally, that this was an extraordinary 
situation that called for extraordinary action (Killing). 
 One of the most startling constructions of the national narrative is Vice President 
Jusuf Kalla’s. He addresses Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth—the massive youth 
paramilitary organization of which many of the killers are high-ranking founders and 
esteemed members), exhibiting the five discursive characteristics identified by Wodak 
and Reisigl. In his nominative and predicative discursive choices, Kalla constructs the 
killers as courageous national heroes and their crimes against civilians as the salvation of 
Indonesia’s democracy. Kalla praises the preman (Indonesian for “gangster”, derived 
from the English “free-man”) spirit of Pemuda Pancasila (Killing). The nation, Kalla 
says, “needs free men! If everyone worked for the government, we’d be a nation of 
bureaucrats; we’d get nothing done! We need free men to get things done” (Killing).  The 
“things” Kalla is referring to are the killings of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians. 
Kalla’s argumentation elaborates a narrative in which heroic citizens did what had to be 
done when government alone could not act. He perspectivizes himself as an involved 
admirer of civilian heroes rather than distancing himself from their deeds. Kalla 
intensifies his narrative by engaging in this brazen celebration of mass executions of 
civilians in an open-air venue with thousands of paramilitary affiliates in attendance. This 
public embrace by a senior government official further intensifies the rightness claims of 
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the official narrative because it is a promise of perpetual collusive relationships and 
unconstrained impunity for the killers. 
At the beginning of The Act of Killing, Anwar Congo, a former gangster and death 
squad leader, shows Oppenheimer a rooftop where he killed thousands of men. In 
Anwar’s discursive choices in repeating the national narrative, he constructs himself and 
the other killers as brave heroes and their victims as weak and unworthy. Anwar proudly 
demonstrates his preferred way of killing—strangling the victim with a wire—for 
Oppenheimer. Anwar’s argumentation justifies the truth and rightness claims of the 
dominant narrative. In his perspectivization of the slaughter, Anwar posits himself as 
fully involved. However, Anwar (self-servingly?) mitigates the force of his assertions by 
telling Oppenheimer that he drinks and takes drugs and goes out dancing to forget what 
he’s done (Killing). “I’ve tried to forget all this with good music” he says. “Dancing [...] 
A little alcohol, a little marijuana… A little… what do you call it? Ecstasy… Once I’d 
get drunk, I’d ‘fly’ and feel happy” (Killing). He then flippantly proceeds to perform his 
cha-cha-cha. Anwar further mitigates his rightness claims by talking about nightmares he 
has about the murders. He tells his friends that he knows these dreams “come from what I 
did… killing people who didn’t want to die. I forced them to die” (Killing). By mitigating 
the force of the national narrative, Anwar opens the door to a challenger narrative in 
which the violence is condemned. 
In a particularly jarring scene from the killers’ reconstruction of the murders, 
Anwar plays the part of a communist being interrogated. He stops the scene, short of 
breath, and says he can’t go on. Oppenheimer plays the scene back to him. Anwar 
recalibrates the perspectivization of his discourse, distancing himself from the scene, in 
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this way further mitigating the force of his justification of official claims of rightness. 
Anwar asks if his feelings when playing the part of a communist suspect—paralyzing 
fear and hopelessness—were what the people he killed had felt (Killing). Oppenheimer 
speaks to him from behind the camera, saying that Anwar’s victims felt much, much 
worse, because Anwar knew it was only a reenactment, whereas his victims knew they 
were actually going to be killed (Killing). At the end of the film Anwar and Oppenheimer 
return to the rooftop where earlier Anwar danced, but by this point, after making his own 
movie reenacting his crimes, Anwar is unable to continue boasting about the murders. He 
begins to retch violently. 
 Oppenheimer’s exploration of the inward price the killers have paid for their 
outward impunity is complemented by his examination of the suffering of surviving 
family members. Whereas the killers live in fear of accountability, yet suffer from the 
lack of it, the victims live with the rage, hatred, bitterness, grief, and despair of justice 
denied as well as with the terror of suffering the same fate as their murdered family 
members at the hands of killers who are still prominent citizens in their communities. The 
victims, both present and absent, tell the insurgent narrative about 1965. Absent victims 
speak through the killers, who gleefully report how the victims tried to flee, wept, and 
begged for mercy. In these accounts of the last words of the dead, we hear their 
predication of themselves as innocent victims, of the killers as savages, and of the 
massacres as a wanton campaign of terror. The counter-narrative that arises from these 
reported statements powerfully undermines the dominant narrative.  
A counter-narrative also emerges from within the confines of an articulation of 
the dominant narrative by an actor in the killers’ film. In one scene, an ethnic Chinese 
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Indonesian cast member volunteers a story to be added to the project. By means of 
complexly dualistic discursive choices, the ethnic Chinese man constructs the episode of 
his stepfather’s execution as humorous and appropriate. He predicates his stepfather as 
despicable and deserving of an ignominious death, the assassins as powerful and justified. 
He does not question the rightness claims of the killers. Yet his perspectivization of 
himself as intimately allied, not with the killers, but with his stepfather, as well as his 
exceedingly emotional intensification of the force of his assertions, combine to 
completely undermine his discursive strategy and reveal a non-strategic hidden discourse 
in which his stepfather is nominated and predicated as a hapless victim to be pitied; the 
killers are nominated and predicated as ruthless villains; and the rightness claim of the 
dominant narrative is challenged.   
The ethnic Chinese man recounts his stepfather’s execution as follows. Killers 
came to their home in the middle of the night and dragged his stepfather away, ignoring 
his mother’s pleas for mercy. The next morning he discovered the body, hidden under an 
oil drum in the road. The man assures Anwar and the others that he doesn’t mean to 
offend them. He tells them how funny his stepfather’s death was, how hilarious the body 
looked in the oil drum. However, he begins to weep uncontrollably. The killers tell him 
that his story is too complicated, that they can’t use every story (Killing). They continue 
shooting a scene, with the ethnic Chinese man playing the part of a suspect being 
interrogated. Crying and spitting, he is unable to regain his composure. He has snot all 
over his face as he speaks both in character, and as the child who lost his father, begging 
for mercy. This man’s unintentional undermining of the dominant narrative through his 
obviously unscripted experience of inhabiting his stepfather’s experience shows the 
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dominant narrative to be a grotesque fabrication. For victims, adopting the dominant 
narrative is only possible through excruciating self-abasement.  
The victims speak again in two other scenes from the film within a film, one the 
massacres at Kampung Kolam, a village of women and children; and the other a 
production number at the end of the film. The village scene, like the interrogation scene, 
directly juxtaposes the dominant and insurgent narratives through competing discourses. 
The women and children, who are untrained actors in the killers’ movie, construct and 
predicate their characters as innocent victims of terror and their killers as brutal monsters. 
During a break in the filming, one of the killers actually reinforces the victims’ discourse 
by bragging about the sexual mutilation of women murdered in 1965 (Killing). He does 
not offer condemnatory argumentation, perspectivize himself remotely, or mitigate the 
force of his discourse. He doesn’t need to, because he is well within the parameters of the 
sanctioned national narrative. This huge area of overlap in the national and challenger 
narratives (the horrifying numbers of the dead, the details of the killings), which the 
killers do not deny, but boast of, presents the greatest hope for the ultimate reconceiving 
of the national narrative and transformation of the cultural conflict.  
In a subtext to the stories of the killers and of the victims, Josh Oppenheimer 
himself advances a narrative in The Act of Killing. Dispensing with the illusion that 
documentaries are neutral factual statements that make themselves, Oppenheimer is 
actually present in the film and converses with the perpetrators at times.  At other times, 
though he does not speak, the audience understands that the perpetrators are responding 
to him. Oppenheimer discursively nominates the people killed in 1965 and predicates 
them with compassion as innocent victims. Oppenheimer’s construction and qualification 
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of the perpetrators is more complex.  In pointing out to Anwar on the set of the killers’ 
film that his unease cannot be equated with the pure terror of innocent people who knew 
they were about to be murdered, Oppenheimer qualifies the perpetrators as morally and 
emotionally detached from their own actions. The viewer gathers, in listening to Adi 
Zulkadry’s defiance of a possible international war crimes tribunal, that Oppenheimer’s 
attitude toward the massacres has been condemnatory (Killing). Nevertheless, in listening 
to the ruminations of the perpetrators and in filming their reenactments, Oppenheimer 
accords human dignity to the killers as well as to the murdered. While his argumentation 
clearly questions the rightness claims of the killers, his perspectivization positions him 
close, engaging them intimately, not remotely. Similarly, the force of Oppenheimer’s 
condemnation of the massacres is mitigated by his compassion for the killers.  
In the production number created by the killers for the end of their movie, 
Anwar’s victims approach him on an elaborate set complete with a chaste chorus line of 
dancers in costumes invoking the flag of Indonesian democracy. The victims drape a 
medal over Anwar’s neck and thank him for killing them and sending them to heaven 
(Killing). Again, the dominant narrative is shown to consist of discourse constructing the 
killers as saviors of the nation. In reliance on the seeming immutability of the narrative, 
Anwar does not perspectivize himself remotely. He maximally intensifies the force of his 
assertions. However, the great weakness in the dominant narrative is obvious from the 
fact that it relies on Anwar’s predication of the dead as understanding that they fully 
deserved the death he meted out and are thankful to him for doing so (Killing).  Again, 
the weakness of the national narrative is that the facts are not in dispute. A mere 
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discursive pivot, from justifying rightness claims to questioning them, unravels the thread 
of the story.   
 
b.     Discourse analysis of The Look of Silence 
The Look of Silence unfolds as the story of a man seeking honesty from the men 
in his community who murdered his brother Ramli in 1965. Adi Rukun, an optometrist, 
uses his profession as a means to engage former killers in conversation, testing their eyes 
while probing them about their involvement in the Snake River massacres in northern 
Sumatra. The film is punctuated with footage Oppenheimer shows to Adi from earlier 
interviews with local perpetrators. In the course of the film, details of Ramli’s gruesome 
and horrifyingly brutal murder are slowly revealed. The complex narrative that ensues is 
one which focuses on victims constructing a counter-narrative about the civilian 
massacres of 1965. As Oppenheimer and Adi confront them, the perpetrators also speak 
and reconstruct the dominant narrative. The insurgent narrative meets firm opposition 
from the killers, but a more nuanced response from the killers’ families.  
The killers nominate the events of 1965, and the roles they played, predicating the 
violence as just and correct. In their argumentation, the killers uphold and discursively 
reconstitute the dominant narrative through such statements as that made by Amir 
Siahaan, who, when describing the murders, says that the killers should be rewarded with 
a cruise to America since they played a role in a matter of international politics. Siahaan’s 
argumentation fully adopts official claims of rightness. He predicates his participation in 
a death squad as revolutionary and essential to the formation of democracy. Adi’s son is 
shown learning about the killings in school. His teacher predicates the communists as 
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ruthless and cruel, and instructs the children to thank men like Amir Siahaan for their 
“heroic struggle” to fight communism and establish a democracy (Silence). 
Siahaan’s predication is echoed in an NBC News report Oppenheimer shows Adi. 
The report features an American reporter, whose argumentation celebrates the massacres 
of 1965 as “the single biggest defeat ever handed to communists anywhere in the world” 
(Silence). He predicates the victims as subhuman by talking about entire families being 
“liquidated” in a “purge” lasting for sixteen months (Silence). In a bizarre 
misappropriation, the alleged voices of victims are used to construct the dominant 
narrative in an interview with a Balinese villager, who tells the American reporter (Ted 
Yates) that communists in the area “realized that they were wrong” and came to village 
leaders asking to be killed (Silence). The perpetrator perspectivizes himself so intimately 
and unapologetically with the dominant narrative that he has the effrontery to violate the 
dead in using them to support official rightness claims. 
Two killers who feature prominently in the film are Amir Hasan and Inong. They 
appear both in the early footage Oppenheimer shows Adi, and later in face-to-face 
interviews Adi orchestrates. In one segment, Amir Hasan and Inong take Oppenheimer to 
the banks of the Snake River, where they discursively nominate the massacre, the 
victims, and their own roles in the killings. They predicate the slaughter as “historic,” an 
episode within a political revolution (Silence). They specifically recall the brutal murder 
of Ramli on the riverbank. Each helps the other remember details of Ramli’s execution. 
Amir goes so far in this unscripted retelling as to tell Oppenheimer where to stand to film 
the scene. Inong even brings a knife along to make the reenactment more “authentic” 
(Silence). They predicate Ramli as an enemy who had to be killed. Amir remarks, “Ramli 
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was probably a good person… But what could we do? It was a revolution” (Silence). 
Under the banner of revolution, Amir Hasan and Inong argumentatively justify the 
rightness claim of the official narrative. They predicate themselves as agents of the 
revolution, perspectivizing themselves close to the killing. Why not? Within the context 
of this narrative, the killings were completely legitimate. Nevertheless, a note of unease 
comes through in their admission that Ramli was “probably” a good person. This insight 
mitigates the force of the killers’ assertions and complicates their predication of 
themselves and their victims. The force of their assertions is further mitigated through 
Ramli’s voice, which is strangely and hauntingly present as Inong and Amir Hasan mimic 
his cries for help before they killed him. 
The dominant narrative is discursively reconstructed again in Adi’s interview with 
Samsir, another killer. Samsir’s adult daughter is also in attendance for this interview, 
and her presence interestingly complicates the narrative that unfolds. Samsir nominates 
killers, victims, and incidents and predicates them predictably. He seems intimately 
perspectivized as he brags of his heroism in bringing a woman’s head to a market to 
intimidate ethnic Chinese Indonesians (Silence). However, Samsir subverts his 
argumentative justification by reporting that he had to drink blood from the bodies of the 
murdered in order to keep from going crazy. As with the admission by Amir Hasan and 
Inong that Ramli was probably a good person, Samsir’s revelation about drinking blood 
to ward off madness mitigates the force of his simplistic predications and rightness 
claims. Samsir’s daughter is clearly uncomfortable throughout this discussion as she 
apparently learns these details for the first time, but she still tries to defend her father. Adi 
tells Samsir and his daughter that his brother was killed by a death squad. The daughter 
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immediately steps into her father’s discourse to perspectivize herself remotely and 
substantially mitigate his rightness claims. She asks Adi to forgive her. Adi tells her it 
isn’t her fault that Samsir is a murderer. The daughter offers her own predication of her 
killer-father. She asks Adi for his compassion to look on her father as an old man, and to 
think about them as family. 
Samsir’s daughter’s sentiment—to think of one another as family—is echoed by 
Amir Hasan’s wife. Amir Hasan has died in the interim since the interview in which he 
and Inong stand on the riverbank reporting the details of how they killed Ramli. In a later 
scene, Oppenheimer and Adi interview Amir Hasan’s wife and sons in their home. Like 
Samsir’s daughter, Amir Hasan’s wife is uncomfortable with the truth claims of the 
dominant narrative and recoils from predicating her husband as a hero for his crimes. She 
perspectivizes herself remotely, claiming to have no recollection of her husband ever 
saying he was involved in the killings—despite her presence in the earlier interview in 
which her husband showed Oppenheimer a book he wrote and illustrated “to bring [his 
death squad involvement] to life” (Silence). Oppenheimer has brought the book along.  
Amir Hasan’s wife looks disturbed as they go through it, and insists she’s never seen it 
before. Oppenheimer reminds her that she was there when her husband showed him the 
book and gave him a copy. Her discursive argumentation continues to question not only 
the rightness claims of the official narrative, but also the truth claims. “We know nothing 
about this. My husband never told us. We never read the book. My husband never said he 
killed anyone” (Silence). One of her sons supports this— “we didn’t know what he was 
doing… he never told us” (Silence). The family’s discourse, so different from that of the 
killers, shows profound discomfort with argumentative assertions of rightness, employing 
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distant perspectivization and mitigation of the force of all aspects of the dominant 
narrative.  
Oppenheimer persists with challenging the authenticity of Amir Hasan’s family’s 
attempts at argumentative disputation of the dominant narrative’s truth claims and remote 
perspectivization of their killer-father and themselves. He confronts them, “I don’t want 
to make you uncomfortable, but Adi is here to speak openly” (Silence). One of Amir 
Hasan’s sons responds, “Everyone around here is friends. Even if their parents were 
killed, we’re all good friends. Now the wound is open, because Joshua makes this film, 
and my father wrote this book—the wound is open” (Silence).  He grows menacing as he 
asks Adi, “ Otherwise you wouldn’t know me, right?” (Silence). Adi replies, “Of course I 
knew. I knew all about this family. All the victims’ families know who the killers are. 
But that doesn’t mean we want revenge” (Silence). This extraordinary exchange reveals 
the troubling persistence of the conflict, which is no longer overt, but clearly structural in 
nature and still dangerously untransformed. It also reveals the openness of families of 
death squad members to the challenger narrative. Whereas their husbands and fathers 
perspectivize themselves intimately in brazenly bragging of their murderous exploits, the 
wives and children are already constructing a discourse that could become a bridge to a 
successor narrative. As Adi and Oppenheimer are about to leave her home, having been 
threatened by her sons, Amir Hasan’s wife tells Adi : “Adi, we apologize. We feel the 
same way you do” (Silence). 
The official narrative perpetrators reconstruct in The Look of Silence is 
maintained by means of excuses and threats. Each killer can boast about his involvement, 
about the ways he most preferred to kill people, when he is talking about victims as a 
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faceless, nameless mass. When confronted by Adi, and by the story of his brother Ramli, 
they quickly backpedal, adjusting their perspectivization from intimate to remote, trying 
to find someone else to predicate as responsible. It was the orders of their commanding 
officers; it was something the government told them to do; the squad they were in charge 
of was killing people in a different location and didn’t take part in the killings at Snake 
River. Although they do maintain their claims to rightness, the killers also seem to inhabit 
a delusional world where they thrive off everyone’s fear of them, while simultaneously 
believing that nobody knows about the specific roles they had in committing the violence. 
The viewer hears several paramilitary death squad members and their families 
reconstructing the dominant narrative and variations in The Look of Silence, as they are 
confronted by Adi and Oppenheimer. But at the heart of the film are Adi and other 
victims constructing a counter-narrative about the events of 1965. Adi predicates his 
brother’s killers as murderers, but also as his neighbors. His approach in interviewing 
them is not to punish or seek revenge, but to find acknowledgement of the crimes they 
committed and to receive their apology. His stance is that if he and they can see one 
another’s humanity, they can move forward and live together as neighbors, the rift in the 
community thus healed. 
Adi interviews Kemat, a man who survived being killed at Snake River by 
jumping out of a prisoner transport truck. Kemat tells Adi that the people in town were 
too scared to watch the victims be lined up and marched out of town. He remembers how 
Ramli screamed for help, saying, “They’re going to kill us all!” (Silence). Adi and Kemat 
go to the banks of the Snake River together, retracing Inong and Amir Hasan’s steps. As 
they step off the road and onto the killing field, Kemat nominates the victims who died 
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there and predicates them as his “friends and family” (Silence). Curiously, Kemat 
perspectivizes himself remotely, saying that he knows God will punish the perpetrators in 
the afterlife. “It is not for us to punish,” he says (Silence). Kemat maintains that the past 
is past. He doesn’t want to remember what happened. “It’s covered up. Why open it 
again?” he asks (Silence). “The wound has healed” (Silence). Kemat was intimately 
involved in the killings, narrowly escaping with his life. He does not question the truth 
and rightness claims of the counter-narrative, but unexpectedly mitigates their force by 
questioning the purpose of advancing a narrative in opposition to the official one. Kemat 
mitigates his feelings, his involvement, his need for honesty and justice, all out of fear of 
the possible consequences of reopening old wounds. Kemat’s underlying fear betrays the 
fallacy of his argument that the wounds have healed.  Adi, who was not born until two 
years after his brother’s death, and is therefore less intimately connected to the events 
than Kemat, takes on a more involved role, perspectivizing himself closely and 
intensifying the truth and rightness claims of the counter-narrative. 
Adi’s mother Rohani, like Kemat, perspectivizes herself distantly. While she 
nominates the players and slaughter, predicating the killers as villainous assassins, the 
victims as innocents, Rohani cautions Adi against getting too involved (Silence). She 
mitigates the intensity of the challenger narrative’s truth and rightness claims by warning 
Adi about the danger of reawakening old tensions. Rohani tells her son to take a club or 
knife along to his interviews to defend himself in case the killers try to kidnap him. She 
prays to Ramli’s spirit to forgive her for letting the killers take him away. Like Kemat, 
Rohani tells Adi that the killers, their children, and their grandchildren will all be 
punished in the afterlife (Silence). Rohani’s discursive mitigation, like Kemat’s, only 
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proves the exact opposite of what she is asserting. If the conflict were really over, she 
would have no reason to fear the consequences of a challenge to the dominant narrative. 
The telling of the final chapter in Ramli’s story reveals a peculiar discursive 
mitigation that poignantly calls the dominant narrative’s rightness claims into question. 
Friends and neighbors took Ramli prisoner and beat him, grievously wounding him. He 
managed to escape, covering his open abdomen with one hand as he crawled home. He 
asked his horrified mother to make him a cup of coffee, but by the time the water had 
boiled, his killers were at the door. Rohani recounts begging them to let her take care of 
Ramli. She tried bribing them with a cow, but they were adamant. They told her they 
were going to take Ramli to the hospital. Rohani tells Adi that she knew this was a lie; 
she knew they were going to kill Ramli (Silence). But somehow in that moment, even 
though they all knew the truth of what was about to unfold, the killers wouldn’t tell 
Rohani explicitly that Ramli was going to be executed for being a communist. They made 
up a lie about something more compassionate, perspectivizing themselves remotely from 
the condition Ramli was already in because of them as well as from the fate he was about 
to meet at their hands. This lie mitigates to the point of denial the force of the killers’ 
rightness claims.  Had the men who came to take the mortally wounded Ramli away been 
sure that what they were doing was right, they could have told his mother so. They could 
have told themselves so. The fact that they did not reveals a fatal weakness in the 
dominant narrative’s rightness claims.  The killers were ashamed of what they had done 
and what they were planning to keep doing, but they were going to do it anyway, so they 
invented a story to make it bearable. 
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In The Look of Silence, as in The Act of Killing, the dominant and challenger 
narratives don’t diverge at the facts, but at the rightness claims. That is, while the facts 
are not widely taught or publicized, everyone who knows anything about 1965 knows 
that hundreds of thousands of civilians were executed by paramilitary killing squads. 
Documents must be collected, and interviews conducted, to ascertain exact numbers, 
dates, places, and identities of killers and killed. But this is not the area of dispute. The 
dispute is about what the facts mean. Were the killings justified in the defense of a 
democratic Indonesia? Are the killers the fathers and heroes of Indonesia’s democracy? 
The official narrative, maintained through successive acts of discursive reconstruction 
backed by the prestige and power of the government, answers these question in the 
affirmative. The counter-narrative repudiates and deplores these rightness claims. 
  
2.     Indications of Indonesia’s Readiness for a Truth and Reconciliation Process from 
Primary Source Materials  
a.     Conflict Transformation 
 Conflict resolution is not a linear process, but rather necessitates the initiation of 
conflict management strategies that unfold in a way that is cognizant of social 
inequalities and tensions (Maddison 58). Conflict is never really over or completely 
resolved. It always finds new ways of expression. In a situation of impunity like 
Indonesia’s, conflict is tangled in collusive relationships that benefit from governmental 
support. The key to building stable societies is to develop relationships where collusion is 
not tolerated, and forge strategies that allow conflict to be expressed without violence. As 
stated by Maddison, reconciliation attempts unfold in contexts charged by “problematic 
historical events” that are still very much alive in the cultural consciousness (57). It is 
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clear from Oppenheimer’s films that the insistence that “the past is past” is, in fact, very 
far from the truth. Laksmi Pamuntjak writes in The Guardian that since the fall of 
Suharto in 1998, Indonesians have vigorously “indulged their new thirst for alternative 
readings on 1965,” to whatever extent they have been able (Pamuntjak). Oppenheimer’s 
films are one piece of a body of other texts, including literature and memoirs, that have 
been created toward this goal. 
    As can be seen from the films, the events of 1965-66 in and of themselves are a 
continuing source of damage caused by unresolved conflict. The unaddressed emotions 
are repressed and give rise to hostility and fear. This is perhaps most clearly 
demonstrated through the predication of the killings as a “wound” that is at once 
historical and current. Kemat, the survivor, and one of death squad member Amir 
Hasan’s sons, both use this term when talking about 1965. For Kemat to predicate his 
own narrow escape from being murdered as a wound—that is, as something that has had 
lasting and profound and negative impacts on his life and his community—is fitting. The 
trauma of his close involvement is surely a painful and heavy wound. The mendacious 
justification of so many murders must also be painful. But for Amir Hasan’s son, this use 
of the word “wound” seems an interesting choice. Is the weight of this wound, which 
both men claim (in spite of all evidence to the contrary) has “healed,” and is not in need 
of reopening or disturbance, shared equally between them? Why do they both use this 
word, when their experiences of history are so vastly different? It is clear that there are 
lasting impacts from impunity and unreconciled divides between neighbors that harm 
society across the borders of victim and perpetrator. 
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The evidence of systemic violence, and the sense that the apparatus of 
government will advantage the perpetrators and their supporters, but will disadvantage, 
and exclude from all protection, the proponents of a challenger to the national narrative, 
is made evident through the fact that Adi Rukun and his family had to be relocated after 
The Look of Silence was made (Stevens). Adi’s queries into the past were made at a great 
personal risk. Many of the Indonesian cast and crew members who worked on The Act of 
Killing and The Look of Silence are “afraid to be openly associated with it,” and are listed 
anonymously in the credits (Kwok “Movie, Books”). The ongoing persecution and 
intimidation of survivors and their families has become structural, as has the conveyance 
of the national narrative to a new generation. The climate surrounding the killings and 
upholding Suharto’s narrative was tense. It was difficult for citizens in communities 
impacted by the killings to speak out or express sympathy to victims due to Suharto’s 
enduring anti-communist campaign and to the fear of being labeled as communists and 
facing severe social repercussions (McGregor). Beginning in the 1980s, Suharto’s New 
Order government implemented the so-called “Clean Environment Policy”—a set of 
discriminatory practices that barred the children and grandchildren of those “allegedly 
connected to the 30 September Movement” from working as teachers, lawyers, 
journalists, civil servants, or members of the military (McGregor). In her closing 
statements from the International People’s Tribunal in the Hague, Prosecutor Silke 
Studzinsky applauded the courage of the survivors who “dared” to travel to the 
Netherlands to testify about the original crimes, as well as facing discrimination and 
stigmatization in contemporary Indonesian society (Studzinsky). It is likely that those 
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who testified faced serious repercussions at home as a result of their involvement in the 
tribunal. 
Pamuntjak notes being taught—like Adi’s son, with “no room for other 
interpretations”—that all Communists were atheists and enemies of the state, and that 
“the defeat of the Indonesian Communist party was crucial to the survival of the nation” 
(Pamuntjak). This construction, Pamuntjak says, has produced “a generation schooled in 
silence and apathy” as well as “successive generations that are wholly ignorant” of their 
own history (Pamuntjak). She references a survey published by the Jakarta Globe in 
2009 which showed that “more than half of the respondents comprising university 
students in Jakarta had never even heard of the mass killings of 1965-1966” (Pamuntjak). 
The misrepresentation of this chapter of history constitutes a further, more subtle type of 
aggression and violence. This can be seen in The Look of Silence when Adi’s son’s 
teacher does not mention the killings that took place locally at the Snake River. Victims’ 
voices and experiences continue to be routinely ignored. 
The trauma survives because it is intergenerational. This is seen in the ethnic 
Chinese man’s response to portraying a communist suspect on the set of the killers’ 
movie in The Act of Killing. Recognizing the trauma that victims and survivors live with 
daily in her closing statements from the tribunal, Studzinsky quotes Jean Améry, a 
survivor of Auschwitz, who said: “Anyone who has been tortured remains tortured. 
Anyone who has suffered torture will never again be at ease in the world. The 
abomination of annihilation is never extinguished” (Studzinsky). The trauma of coming 
face to face with the killers and torturers of one’s family members daily is an act of 
violence. The widespread ignorance of crimes against humanity is an act of violence. The 
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repression of counter-narratives and alternate tellings of history is an act of violence, and 
it compounds this trauma on future generations of both victims and killers. 
If Maddison’s theory that conflict does not cease, but simply continues after an 
episode of catastrophic violence, is supported by the post-conflict situation in Indonesia, 
then the next question is whether there are indications that the conflict is being 
transformed. That is, is the conflict being brought into the political sphere where it can be 
managed without violence? What does it mean, for example, that a government official 
recently praised the paramilitary organization responsible for many of the executions for 
doing what governments cannot? There is an implicit acknowledgement here that 
democratic governments cannot engage in the killing of citizens without due process 
provided in the context of authorized criminal justice processes. It seems clear that the 
politicization of the conflict has not happened at all or is in its infancy. Here we have a 
government official coming right out and saying— “this type of slaughter is necessary, 
but it has to be done by paramilitaries, and you may be sure that we will support you 
from a safe distance, and thank you afterwards, and that we will not hold you 
accountable.” 
 Although a government commission in 2012 engaged in fact finding and wrote a 
report, the government did not follow up with the institution of truth and reconciliation 
processes. As Oppenheimer’s films demonstrate, the dominant narrative is still 
substantially supported by the government. However, the narrative is not intractable. In 
groundbreaking developments in April 2016, President Widodo instituted National 
Symposium on the 1965 Tragedy which took place in Jakarta (Melvin). The symposium 
may prove to be a first step toward a truth and reconciliation process. The strength of 
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counter-narratives, tentative government initiatives, and the progress of unofficial 
processes, indicate readiness and a path forward if the government elects to invest its 
power, resources, and prestige in designing and implementing a process to transform the 
conflict.  Dialogue, memory and memorialization, apology and forgiveness, and 
reconciliation are evolving informally on a small scale, primarily, but not exclusively, in 
non-governmental arenas. 
  
b.     Dialogue 
Adi goes to the homes of the killers to talk to them. He realizes they will not 
initiate this discussion. He sees the path to revising the narrative as reliant on interaction 
and communication. He positions himself as a humble and gentle person. He does not 
demand that the killers admit to murdering his brother, offer him any form of 
compensation, or leave town. Adi is not looking for revenge, but for ways to talk with 
people in his own community who are deeply divided from one another based on which 
side of the conflict they are on. This strategy is well-aligned with the process of dialogue 
as a tool of conflict transformation. Dialogue transforms the way people in deeply 
divided societies relate to each other (Maddison 225) by creating opportunities for 
opposing parties to begin to learn how to understand one another differently and to 
imagine new relational possibilities by speaking openly with one another (225). 
Unfortunately, however, dialogue is not as simple as bringing victims and 
perpetrators together to talk about the past and the ongoing conflict between them. 
Constructive dialogue can only reach the goal of humanizing historical conflicts 
(Maddison 216) if it is facilitated by government agencies. Further, dialogue must lead to 
the implementation of concrete action, such as public policy revisions (Noriega, as qtd. in 
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Maddison 267). This process depends on the patience and willingness of individuals, 
communities, and government agencies to collaborate (269). 
The process of initiating dialogue on a large scale about the catastrophe of 1965 in 
Indonesia is rife with frequent setbacks. Journalists call for official apologies; citizen 
groups such as the witnesses who testified in the Hague call for the international 
community to nominate the massacres and predicate them as crimes against humanity; 
some political bodies make statements about the crimes committed, but then others step 
in to say that they see no need to address events long past. Worse still is the silence of 
many political actors and institutions. Many Indonesians have been disappointed by 
President Widodo, who promised in his election campaigns that he would take action 
regarding the slaughter of 1965, but refused early in his administration to issue an official 
apology to the victims (Pamuntjak). However, President Widodo recently took decisive 
action by following up the first-ever governmentally-instituted symposium on the events 
of 1965 with the authorization of a formal inquiry (Melvin). These steps may lead to 
dialogue structured by the government, which would maximize the possibility of a 
beneficial outcome. 
At this point, non-governmental bodies have been active in trying to initiate 
dialogue. Indeed, it seems like the starting place for dialogue so far is at the level of 
individuals like Adi Rukun. Person-to-person interactions may be beneficial, and may 
open a door to formally-instituted governmental truth and reconciliation processes. In an 
interview with Dana Stevens of Slate, Oppenheimer quotes Adi as saying that meeting 
the perpetrators is helpful because it can be a way for killers and victims to recognize 
their shared humanity. Adi says that he hopes, in approaching the perpetrators as their 
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neighbor, “‘with empathy and an attempt to understand,’” he may be able to show the 
killers that the victims were not one-dimensional sadists, but perhaps that they too were 
gentle people who did not deserve to be massacred (Stevens). This realization may lead 
perpetrators to recognize wrongdoing, and can be a starting point for apology and 
forgiveness (Stevens).  “‘Once they apologize,’” Adi says, “‘ I’ll be able to forgive them, 
because I’ll be able to separate their crime from their humanity. Then we’ll be able to live 
together as human beings and as neighbors instead of perpetrator and victim, afraid of 
each other’” (Stevens). 
Adi’s counter-narrative arises from his dialogue with killing squad members and 
is contextualized in rhetorics of morality, “moral responsibility,” honesty, accountability, 
and forgiveness (Silence). Every experience Adi has with the killers involves their 
distancing themselves—“trying to wash [their] hands”—from any sort of responsibility 
(Silence). So, perplexingly, while perpetrators will happily recount their actions killing, 
beating, and interrogating suspected communists, none of them is willing to accept any 
amount of moral responsibility to their community for executing innocent people. Adi 
utilizes dialogue as a way of “opening” and revising a “distorted” history (Silence). By 
opening history up for discussion, Adi believes that the community can come together to 
make sense of it differently, in a way that recognizes the experiences of the marginalized 
population. The strides Adi makes to initiate dialogue are courageous, yet they ultimately 
fall short because they lack institutional support. Amir Siahaan, M.Y. Basrun, and one of 
Amir Hasan’s sons all threaten Adi when he appears to be overstepping the boundaries 
set by the dominant narrative, revealing their vulnerability to being re-predicated as 
criminals (instead of as heroes) in a new narrative. 
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 There are certain limits to what is attainable when dialogue is concentrated at the 
level of individual interactions. Government agencies need to be involved. It is 
unacceptable that attempts at revising the meaning of the commonly agreed upon facts, 
such as in the report issued by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas 
HAM)—which deemed 1965 as a gross human rights violation—have been rejected by 
some ministers and governmental agencies (Aritonang, “1965 Mass Killings”). The fact 
that interactions such as those between Adi and the killers in his community are taking 
place, the publication of books such as Laksmi Pamuntjak’s Amba and Leila S. Chudori’s 
Pulang, which address the trauma of 1965 (Kwok, “Movie, Books”), as well as articles 
and journalism calling for state action, are strong indications of readiness for dialogues to 
take place on a larger scale. As discussed, recent actions by President Widodo may also 
be indicative of readiness among Indonesia’s political elites (Melvin). 
  
c.     Memory and Memorialization 
Challenging ahistorical national narratives of state-sanctioned violence and 
creating new narratives, new tellings of history, is the first step to creating a shared vision 
for how a society will deal with the aftermath of traumatic violence. At the root of 
changing dominant, non-factual narratives is coming to a sense of agreement on how the 
events will be remembered. This may require “revising pre-existing narratives” and 
earlier experiences (Opotow 161). Establishing a shared narrative relies on constructive 
dialogue, in which victims and perpetrators have space to articulate their experiences. 
This is a “prerequisite for achieving accountability, meaningful reconciliation, and a 
foundation for a common future” (Chapman, as qtd. in Maddison 49). 
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A significant step that Indonesia’s government has taken to this end is the 
Komnas HAM report. Over four years of research went into compiling a report that 
ultimately deemed the events of 1965 as “state-sponsored gross human rights 
violation[s]” (Aritonang, “National Commision”). This promising conclusion was 
disappointingly rejected by the Coordinating Political, Legal, and Security Affairs 
Minister Djoko Suyanto, who responded that “the mass killings were justified to save the 
country from communism. The Attorney General said that the evidence [provided in the 
report] was insufficient to justify a legal probe” (Kwok, “Movie, Books”). Suyanto also 
stated that the country “would not be what it is today if [the killings] didn’t happen” 
(Aritonang, “1965 Mass Killings”). It is clear that resistance to opening up about the 
crimes does come at a cost for state actors and institutions that are implicated in them. 
Understandably, they do not want to advance reports that counter their claims to rightful 
authority. The wariness, defensiveness, and territoriality of government actors are part of 
the ongoing manifestation of the untransformed conflict and are impediments to a truth 
and reconciliation process in Indonesia. They are indicative of a continuing lack of will 
and readiness on the part of many government actors to create and implement such a 
project.  
The amazing thing about Indonesia is that if President Widodo’s fledgling efforts 
blossom into an authentic truth and reconciliation process, the “truth” processes 
(dialogue, memory retrieval, and memorialization) will be relatively easy to implement. 
Memory retrieval is not a problem where the killers have enjoyed impunity. Since the 
killers don’t deny the facts, establishing a shared account of what happened, who was 
involved, and when will be relatively simple. The question will be how the facts should 
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be interpreted. The government still largely supports and protects proponents of the 
narrative that the killings were part of a nation-building process; that the dead were 
casualties of the creation of a democratic Indonesia. But there are also people articulating 
a more nuanced version of the official story. Anwar has his doubts about the rightness of 
what he did, for example. Although it is not clear if Anwar has taken any action resulting 
from his experiences making The Act of Killing, Oppenheimer’s personal generosity and 
openness to the killers is an approach that could provide a framework for embracing a 
meaning for the facts that  does not necessarily insist on revenge, punishment, or 
stigmatization of the families of the killers.  
The extent to which efforts have been made toward the public memorialization of 
the crimes of 1965 still privileges the dominant narrative. A museum commemorating the 
deaths of the generals has been built at Lubang Buaya, the site where their bodies were 
discovered (McGregor). The Sacred Pancasila Monument additionally reconstructs the 
narrative of the failed coup as a communist plot threatening the national ideology. 
Commemorations for the massacre victims have yet to be undertaken, as the narrative to 
which these efforts would correspond is still contested. The memorialization of the 
successor narrative will entail dismantling some of these earlier memorialization efforts. 
The shrine for the murdered generals does not need to be torn down, but the museum will 
have to be rethought to curate exhibits telling an unsanitized story of government 
engineering of mass executions with the complicity of various civil society actors. When 
the government is ready to move forward, victim-centered memorialization suited to 
Indonesia's situation, in which a vast number of paramilitary actors were complicit with 
the army, could be designed. Dates and sites of mass murders are known. National days 
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of remembrance could be declared in honor of the victims. Memorials of some kind, like 
the stupas in Cambodia, could be erected at the sites of massacres. Gallery space could be 
used for local artists to make and exhibit their own kind of response to the trauma. 
Statues or monuments could be constructed in areas hardest hit by the violence. Local 
artists could be commissioned to paint murals. These are steps like those undertaken in 
countries around the world to create memorials that have a public presence and manifest 
the adoption of a new narrative.  Such memorials impact how people engage with and 
remember the violence of their past. Large-scale projects requiring collaboration could be 
particularly conducive to healing. 
  
d.     Apology and Forgiveness 
Apologies are not just an act, but also a process “focused on the possibility of a 
future relationship” (Verdeja, as qtd. in Maddison 226). Apology is meaningless if it is 
not followed by decisive action. The Indonesian government has not facilitated projects 
that draw victims and perpetrators together to build relationships forged through 
“apology, forgiveness and individual and societal healing” (Maddison 225). But, as can 
be seen in Oppenheimer’s films, nongovernmental processes provide an insight into how 
ready people are to begin initiating processes of forgiveness, as well as of what form 
apology and forgiveness processes might take. Forgiveness cannot be extracted from 
survivors by pressure, but Adi’s willingness to go down this path may be an indication 
that other victims are as well.  
Apologies such as those offered by Samsir’s daughter and Amir Hasan’s wife are 
valuable in that they seem to arise from a genuine feelings of remorse in response to the 
facts of their beloved family members’ complicity in mass killings.  Unfortunately, these 
Mack 64 
apologies are also highly superficial and insufficient as a way of recognizing fault and 
offering condolences.  Amir Hasan’s wife, especially, offers her apology to Adi in a 
moment of extreme tension. Her sons have just begun to threaten Adi and Oppenheimer. 
She has already left the room crying during the interview because they don’t listen to her 
insistence (despite incontrovertible evidence to the contrary) that she never knew about 
her husband’s involvement in the murders. She apologizes not because she truly feels 
sorry about lying, or about her husband’s actions, but because she is trying to placate a 
hostile situation. Her apology carries little weight, not enough to constitute meaningful 
reparation. Samsir’s daughter’s apology is a little more noteworthy, but both of these 
apologies occur in the realm of person-to-person healing which, while valuable, does 
little to change the larger situation. 
A strong inclination to leave the past in the past, to avoid reopening old wounds; a 
willingness to admit that wrongs occurred, while insisting that there’s nothing to be done 
about it now; a fear that seriously challenging the official narrative might lead to a 
renewal of violence—all are impediments to apology. Interestingly, while actual killing 
squad members are generally hostile to the idea of apology, their family members 
articulate mitigated versions of the national narrative which are less averse to apology.  
On the whole, victims are interested in receiving apologies, as long as procuring them 
does not lead to renewed victimization.  At least some of them, such as Adi, would likely 
answer even a marginally adequate apology with forgiveness. 
There is an interesting moment in The Act of Killing when Adi Zulkadry 
approaches the topic of apology and forgiveness with Anwar. The two are fishing 
together, and Adi remarks that if he were the child of a communist killed in 1965-66, who 
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had, as a result, lived a difficult life (due to the effects of deeply entrenched 
institutionalized impunity and structural violence—limiting survivors’ access to 
education, employment, legal services and protections, etc.), it would make sense for him 
to be angry at the men who killed his father. “This needs to be changed,” Adi says (this 
being the disenfranchisement of children and family members of murdered communists). 
“There’s been no official apology—but what’s so hard about apologizing? The 
government would apologize, not us. It would be like medicine. It would reduce the pain” 
(Killing). Adi Zulkadry’s profound mitigation of the rightness claims of the national 
narrative is thrilling because it is the only direct recognition voiced by any of the killers 
that the retaliation they so fear from the children of their victims would be justified. Adi 
perspectivizes himself remotely in his discourse about apology and reconciliation.  He is 
rightly conceiving of government action as the only real solution to a government 
problem. Yet troublingly, Adi removes himself (and all other killers) from the process. 
Adi is right in assuming that his actions alone would not be sufficient to start 
processes of healing and forgiveness, but he falls short of realizing the integral role he 
would need to play for these apologies to truly “reduce the pain.” An official government 
apology must be accompanied by the perpetrators’ direct involvement for meaningful 
conflict transformation, dialogue, apology, and reconciliation processes to take place. 
Some indications of readiness to walk that path are shown by Anwar Congo, Amir 
Hasan’s wife, and Samsir’s daughter. Apology is a process and need not be perfect in 
order to support the politicization of the conflict. Conflict caused by the government and 
self-servingly narrativized by the government is transformed when the government 
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intervenes to substitute a more correct narrative and to bring the conflict into the political 
sphere. 
Various actors in the Indonesian government have attempted to initiate measures 
addressing the conflict since the end of Suharto’s reign. President Bacharuddin Habibie, 
for example, released all remaining political prisoners and ended the tradition of showing 
the propaganda film on September 30th each year (McGregor). Habibie also promised 
“revisions to school history textbooks that had previously encouraged hatred towards all 
alleged communists” (McGregor). President Abdurrahman Wahid suggested lifting the 
ban on communism and proposed judicial investigations into the killings of 1965-66 
(McGregor). His suggestions were met with mass protests from Islamic groups across the 
country (McGregor). In 2004, “the push for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission [...] 
encompassing the 1965-66 killings gained momentum,” but in 2006 the project was 
abandoned (McGregor). These efforts, as well as the commissioning of the Komnas 
HAM report, illustrate the government’s capability to institute the necessary processes for 
truth and reconciliation to begin to take place. Whether recent development in this 
direction will bear fruit remains to be seen, but the importance of the National 
Symposium on the 1965 Tragedy and the institution of an inquiry cannot be overstated 
(Melvin).  
Greater vision and leadership is needed to conceive of a process to bring former 
enemies “into relationships with one another through apology, forgiveness and individual 
and societal healing” (Maddison 225).  An apology by the government to the victims and 
their surviving family members would serve to open ‘political space’ in which ‘citizens 
may reflect on more critical views of their troubled histories’” (226). Elite apologies are 
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an important first step to instilling greater political stability (226). The power and 
efficaciousness of official apologies will depend in part on the willingness of men like 
Anwar Congo to personally apologize and seek forgiveness. 
  
e.     Reconciliation 
“Recovering systematically repressed facts about the violent insult to the 
community, followed by apology and forgiveness to the extent those are achievable, 
opens a door to reconciliation” (Hamber and Kelly, as qtd. in Maddison 49-50). Hamber 
and Kelly detail five elements that they see contained in reconciliation: “the development 
of a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; a means of acknowledging and 
dealing with the past; the building of positive relationships; significant cultural and 
attitudinal change; and substantial social, economic, and political change” (49-50). 
Finding new ways to bring people together over barriers of “suspicion, prejudice and 
inequality” (Villa-Vicencio as qtd. in Maddison 46) that are deeply historically 
entrenched brings about reconciliation as an ongoing process. 
  The perpetrators of the killings in Indonesia may not ever distance themselves 
from the rightness of their crimes. Fifty years of impunity, and of having their crimes 
justified and their rightness claims argumentatively upheld not only by their own 
communities and government, but by the international community as well, may have 
irreversibly impacted the way the killers predicate themselves and their actions. As seen 
in both of Oppenheimer’s films, perpetrators have no hesitation when it comes to aligning 
themselves with what happened. They might feel conflicted about it, but on the whole 
they all seem perfectly willing to recount the details of the past. 
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The promise for conflict transformation may instead lie with the children and 
grandchildren of death squad members. Children of killers, such as Amir Hasan’s sons or 
Samsir’s daughter, seem to want to try to distance themselves from what happened. They 
make attempts to mitigate their parents’ involvement in the killings (“we had no idea”, 
“he never told us”). They offer apologies to Adi. They do not distance themselves from 
the predications and rightness claims of the national narrative completely, but they do 
seem to be trying to create some distance between themselves and the acts of the killings. 
They talk about moving forward as a society. It is possible that these utterances, often the 
result of duress, could be stepping stones to successfully challenging the narrative and 
initiating accountability, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation over time; in short, to 
transforming the conflict by bringing it into a sphere in which the fear of a resumption of 























VII.     Conclusion 
  
Clearly, the conflict which exploded in murderous rage abetted by government 
actors in 1965 persists in Indonesia today in ways that are severely injurious and deeply 
menacing. Truth and reconciliation is the only way forward for Indonesia. The 
alternative, criminal justice processes, are unsuitable due to the sheer numbers of 
perpetrators, the diffusion of responsibility, government authorization of killing squad 
activities, the deaths of many primary architects of the policy of extermination, and the 
cumulative effects of 50 years of impunity (Androff 1961-62).  While any truth and 
reconciliation process must be managed by the government, non-governmental actors 
(such as Oppenheimer, Adi, citizens who testified at the People’s Tribunal in the Hague) 
have shown that there is some readiness in the Indonesian community as well as a path 
suited to the unique circumstances of Indonesia’s relationship to the catastrophic events 
of 1965. Possibly as a result of these non-governmental processes, there are now also 
signs of readiness among political elites at the highest level of national government, as 
manifested by the recent Symposium on the 1965 Tragedy.  
For conflict to be meaningfully and effectively transformed, processes aimed at 
doing so must take into consideration how dialogues between victims and perpetrators 
can take place with the support to lead to direct action. These efforts must also 
contemplate the difficulty of coming to a consensus about the meaning of the killings as 
an unjustifiable sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Indonesian lives. Apologies will 
need to be coupled with action that in some way alleviates the suffering of family 
members from the impacts of structural and indirect violence. Collusive relationships 
must no longer be tolerated. Each of these is an enormous task. Disentangling corruption 
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and impunity from the social fabric to make room for a new narrative and new venues for 
conflict management is a process that requires the sustained effort of generations. One 
certainty is that such behavior as Djoko Suyanto’s rejection of the Komnas HAM 
findings and Vice President Kalla’s wholehearted support of Pemuda Pancasila 
compound the problem and tend to negate advances produced by movements that seek 
change. Recent actions taken by President Widodo show the way towards imagining and 
implementing the necessary processes. Lasting, large-scale changes will never be realized 
without an increasing commitment on the part of political elites. The call to the 
international community to take full responsibility for their historical complicity and to 
condemn these crimes may be one way of facilitating this transition. 
Is Indonesia ready for a truth and reconciliation process to help rewrite the 
narrative of the killings of 1965-66? At the level of the people, the answer seems to be 
yes. Adi Rukun’s example is extraordinary, but not unique. People are speaking out about 
the injustice through many means, writing and publishing books, attending screenings of 
Oppenheimer’s films, accessing and creating journalism online, even going so far as to 
take their stories to the Hague. These are huge steps in the process of seeking justice and 
changing the way the conflict is expressed and remembered. The actions of individuals, 
and of individuals working together, can have amazing transformative effects. Attention 
must now focus on the government, which fosters the complicated collusive relationships 
that allow for uncontested impunity. The effects of 50 years of impunity complicate the 
elements active in Indonesia’s nascent process (dialogue; memory and memorialization; 
apology and forgiveness; and reconciliation). The government will need to work with 
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communities to reshape the cultural imagination of how the conflict is managed, and to 
adequately redefine the role of violence in Indonesia going forward.  
Ciorciari and Ramji-Nogales talk about the importance of neutral, non-political 
ceremonies and rituals to facilitating healing and new ways of remembering historical 
violence, noting that these rituals tend to be most effective when they are connected to 
local cultural customs (215). This brings to mind a Muslim ritual of forgiveness and 
acceptance that I witnessed while living in Jakarta as a student. After Ramadan, I joined 
my classmates and teachers at school in the ritual of halal bi-halal. The name comes from 
the Arabic “to accept” or “to forgive” (“Halal Bihalal”). Every person came face to face 
with every other person. They bowed and touched hands in a sign of respect, asking 
through this gesture for apology for any wrongs they may have committed and returning 
by the same gesture acceptance and forgiveness. 
While halal bi-halal is tied specifically to Muslim cultural practices, and thus 
may be exclusive of Indonesian Christians and Buddhists, it is a culturally relevant ritual 
that could provide a recognizable starting point at the onset of a truth and reconciliation 
process in Indonesia. Halal bi-halal reveals a well-known path of truth and reconciliation 
which is familiar to most Indonesians. There is every reason to expect from them a 
beautifully conceived and implemented process that will succeed in revising the national 
narrative, bridging the deep divides in Indonesian society, and transforming the conflict 






VIII.       Appendices 







Appendix B: Critical Discourse Analysis for The Act of Killing  
 




How are persons, objects, 
phenomena/events, 
processes, and actions 




Discursive Construction of Social Actors, 
Objects/Phenomena/Events, Actions: 
● Proper names: Anwar Congo, 
Herman Koto, Adi Zulkadry, Jusuf 
Kalla, Ibrahim Sinik 
● Pronoun Use: ‘I’, ‘us’, ‘we’--group 
identity further expressed through 
appellations of ‘the people’ and ‘the 
nation’--killers were defending the 
nation’s democracy 
● Events were necessary 
● Ideological: communism, democracy, 
preserving social order 
What characteristics, 
qualities, and features are 






of Social Actors, Objects, Phenomena, 
Events, Processes, and Actions: 
● Killers: brave, heroic, courageous 
national heroes 
● Victims/Communists: weak, 
suspicious, subversive, unworthy 
● Sadistic (applied both to methods 
used by killers and to the communists 
who killed the 6 generals—justifying 
cruelty by emphasizing cruelty of 
others) 
● Extraordinary events calling for 
extraordinary action 
● Salvation of Indonesia’s democracy 
● Praise for free-man spirit of Pemuda 
Pancasila 
● Voices of victims emerge in 
reenactments begging, pleading, 
weeping—showing their own 
perception of their innocence and of 
the killers’ brutality  
● Ethnic Chinese actor: predicating his 
stepfather as deserving of death, 
assassins as powerful and justified 
● Women and children actors as 
innocent victims, begging for mercy 
Mack 76 
● Oppenheimer: innocent victims, 
perpetrators detached from their own 
actions 
● Victim actors seeming to understand 
that they deserved death in final 
production number 
Which arguments are 





Arguments supporting truth and 
rightness claims of the dominant national 
narrative: 
● Kalla: heroic citizens doing what 
needed to be done when gov’t alone 
could not act 
● Victim actors awarding Anwar with a 
medal, thanking him for killing them—
supports killers as national saviors  
Arguments countering truth and 
rightness claims of the dominant national 
narrative:  
● Anwar admitting that he has 
nightmares about the killings, that he 
killed people who did not want to die 
● Ethnic Chinese actor’s emotional 
outburst challenging narrative by 
predicating killers as ruthless villains, 
illuminating his victimization and fear 
From what perspective are 
these nominations, 






● Most killers are willing to express 
intimate involvement 
● Ibrahim Sinik telling the crew that he 
smeared names of suspects so that 
everyone would hate them 
● Ibrahim Sinik saying that he got to 
choose who lived and who died 
Distance: 
● Ethnic Chinese actor: perspectivizes 
himself as allied with his communist 
stepfather 
Mack 77 
Are the respective utterances 
articulated overtly, are they 





● Anwar: admitting to drinking and 
taking drugs to cope, admitting that 
he has nightmares 
● Anwar stopping the interrogation 
scene short of breath, wondering if 
he just experienced what his victims 
felt 
Intensification: 
● Kalla at a public, open air rally, 
praising the ability of gangsters to get 
things (i.e., killing civilians) done 
● Kalla praising Anwar and others in a 
large open venue 
● Oppenheimer: assuring Anwar his 
































Appendix C: Critical Discourse Analysis for The Look of Silence  
 




How are persons, objects, 
phenomena/events, 
processes, and actions 




Discursive Construction of Social Actors, 
Objects/Phenomena/Events, Actions: 
● Killings referred to as the 
proceedings of politics by Amir 
Siahaan, M.Y. Basrun 
● Pronoun use: ‘us’ ‘They’ ‘We’--both 
killers and victims express collective 
identity 
● Adi calls killers ‘murderers’ and his 
‘neighbors’ 
● Amir Siahaan calls communists 
‘subversive’ to the social order  
● One of Amir Hasan’s sons says that 
everyone in the community—victims 
and killers alike—are friends 
● Victims said to have screamed for 
help 
● Kemat refers to victims on the banks 
of Snake River as “friends” and 
“family” 
What characteristics, qualities, 
and features are attributed to 






of Social Actors, Objects, Phenomena, 
Events, Processes, and Actions: 
● Adi: seeking honesty 
● Killers predicate events as just and 
correct 
● Amir Siahaan: role in death squad 
was revolutionary, essential to 
formation of democracy 
● School Teacher: communists were 
ruthless and cruel 
● Killers’ “heroic struggle” 
● NBC News Report: families were 
liquidated in a purge lasting 16 
months 
● Inong and Amir Hasan talking about 
the historic killings at Snake River, 
communists as enemies 
● Samsir’s daughter asking Adi to 
forgive them, think of them as family 
● Killings referred to as a wound both 
by Kemat and one of Amir Hasan’s 
sons 
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● Adi: “opening” and revising a 
“distorted” history 
Which arguments are 




Arguments supporting truth and 
rightness claims of the dominant 
national narrative: 
● Amir Siahaan saying that killers 
should be rewarded with a cruise to 
America since they played a role in 
international politics 
● NBC News Report celebrates the 
killings—single biggest defeat 
handed communism  
● NBC News Report: Balinese villager 
saying the communists realized they 
were wrong and asked to be killed 
● Amir Hasan and Inong: agents of 
revolution 
Arguments countering truth and 
rightness claims of the dominant 
national narrative:  
● Amir Hasan and Inong: saying that 
Ramli was ‘probably’ a good 
person—not a one dimensional 
villain, but someone who had to be 
killed in the context of political 
revolution  
● Families of killers quickly step away 
from direct involvement—the Hasan 
family all say they’ve never seen the 
book their father wrote before, that 
they never knew he was involved 
because he never talked about it  
From what perspective are 
these nominations, 






● Most killers readily associate 
themselves closely to the killings. 
They are eager to talk about the 
roles they had. They understand that 
many people know that they were 
involved in the killings to some 
extent 
● Amir Hasan writing and illustrating a 
book to bring the events to life 
Distance: 
● Samsir’s daughter says she never 
knew about her father’s involvement 
in the killings—so do Amir Hasan’s 
wife and sons  
● Hasan family attempt to disengage 
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from discussion about their father’s 
filmed admission of his role as a 
killer 
● Killers back away from direct 
involvement when met with the direct 
relative of a victim 
● Although intimately involved, Kemat 
distances himself, says it’s not for 
him to punish the perpetrators 
● Rohani distances herself, showing 
that the conflict is not really over 
Are the respective utterances 
articulated overtly, are they 





● Amir Hasan and Inong mimicking 
Ramli’s cries for help before they 
killed him 
● Samsir and Inong both talk about 
drinking blood to keep from going 
crazy, that many killers killed so 
many they went crazy 
Intensification: 
● Adi directly challenges killers who 
attempt to place responsibility on 
someone else, maintains that they 
are guilty, that what they did to his 
brother and to many others was a 
crime 
● Adi countering the lesson his son 
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